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EXPANDING THE CIRCLE OF MEMBERSHIP BY
RECONSTRUCTING THE "ALIEN" t: LESSONS FROM
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE "PROMISE
ENFORCEMENT" CASES
Victor C. Romero*
Recent legal scholarship suggests that the Supreme Court's decisions on immigrants'
rights favor conceptions of membership over personhood. Federal courts are often re-
luctant to recognize the personal rights claims of noncitizens because they are not
members of the United States. Professor Michael Scaperlanda argues that because the
courts have left the protection of noncitizens' rights in the hands of Congress and,
therefore, its constituents, U.S. citizens must engage in a serious dialogue regarding
membership in this polity while considering the importance of constitutional princi-
ples of personhood. This Article takes up Scaperlanda's challenge. Borrowing from
recent research in social psychology, this Article contends that "We the People" can
better inform our ideas of polity membership by resisting existing invidious stereo-
types of the noncitizen as the "alien" and by embracing instead the notion of
equal personhood. This Article also urges citizens to demand the repeal of the
"court-stripping" provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996. These provisions encourage the federal government to
renege on promises not to deport noncitizen defendants in exchange for assistance in
criminal prosecutions. Without fear ofjudicial review, the government is free to enter
into cooperation agreements with noncitizen defendants and then breach those
agreements with impunity so as to achieve its dual goals of criminal prosecution and
deportation. The federal government should not be allowed to break its promises, es-
pecially when the goal of the agreement with the noncitizen is to facilitate a criminal
prosecution, not to impact immigration law.
t Except to make a statement in this title, I prefer the terms "noncitizen" to "alien"
and "undocumented immigrant" to "illegal alien" because there are pejorative connotations
attached to the word "alien." However, I favor the term "alienage jurisprudence" rather
than "citizenship jurisprudence" because the former captures the dehumanizing nature of
such categorizations. See Victor C. Romero, The Congruence Principle Applied: Rethinking Equal
Protection Review of Federal Alienage Classifications After Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peria, 76
OR. L. REv. 425, 426 n.4 (1997) [hereinafter Romero, Congruence]; Victor C. Romero, Equal
Protection Held Hostage: Ransoming the Constitutionality of the Hostage Taking Act, 91 Nw. U. L.
REv. 573, 573 n.4 (1997) [hereinafter Romero, Equal Protection]; see also Kevin R. Johnson,
"Aliens" and the U.S. Immigration Law: The Social and Legal Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263, 268 (1996-97) (discussing "how the term alien masks the
privilege of citizenship and helps tojustify the legal status quo").
* Associate Professor of Law, Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson School of
Law. B.A., 1987, Swarthmore College; J.D., 1992, University of Southern California Law
Center; e-mail: vcr1@psu.edu.
As always, I appreciate the support of the following friends and colleagues whose insight-
ful comments on previous drafts helped sharpen my thinking on this difficult subject: Jack
Chin, Harvey Feldman, Kevin Johnson, Hiroshi Motomura, Eric Muller, Michael Scaper-
landa, Laurel Terry, and Frank Wu. I would also like to thank Penny Rebert, Bill Dorgan,
and Amy Phillips for their invaluable research assistance; Dean Peter Glenn for the gener-
ous funding for this Article; and most importantly, my wife, Corie, and my family in the
Philippines for their untiring love and support.
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INTRODUCTION
Estrella Santiago, a Mexican citizen, is arrested for her involve-
ment as a drug courier in an international cocaine-smuggling
conspiracy. She is tried in federal court for her drug offense, and if
convicted, she will likely be haled into immigration court as a de-
portable' person for her involvement in drug trafficking. The
Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) prosecuting her criminal
case agrees to recommend a reduced sentence and promises that
Ms. Santiago will not be deported if she testifies against her co-
conspirators and waives any objections to deportation. Ms. Santi-
ago, after consulting with her attorney, agrees to the deal. After
pleading guilty and waiving objections to her deportability, Ms.
Santiago receives a deportation order from a U.S. immigration
judge requiring her to surrender to the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service (INS) authorities. When Ms. Santiago complains to
the INS that the federal prosecutor offered her immunity from
deportation, the INS replies that the AUSA had no authority to
promise immunity and that the INS is therefore not bound by the
federal prosecutor's promise. Terrified at the idea of being sent
back to Mexico only to be killed by henchmen of angry co-
conspirators convicted by her testimony, Ms. Santiago decides to
seek to enforce the AUSA's promise in federal court. However,
upon the government's motion, the district court judge dismisses
Ms. Santiago's "promise enforcement" suit for lack of jurisdiction,
citing Congress's recent enactment of the Illegal Immigration Re-
form and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 3 which
limits the jurisdiction of federal courts over challenges to immigra-
tion deportation orders.4
This fictional scenario, based in reality,5 captures the crucial dif-
6ference between the citizen and noncitizen in the United States: A
1. While the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA) uses the term "removal" rather than "deportation," see IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, § 304, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-587 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 8 U.S.C.), "deportation" is a term more commonly used in immigration literature, see,
e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(A) (Supp. II 1996) (defining "order of deportation"), and
therefore, I use it here.
2. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 241(a) (2) (B) (I), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(I) (Supp. II 1996) (originally codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994))
(requiring a noncitizen convicted of a crime to be deported under some circumstances).
3. 110 Stat. 3009-546.
4. See8 U.S.C. § 1252 (Supp. II 1996).
5. See infra Part II.B.
6. For more information on the trials of noncitizens, see generally Kevin R.Johnson,
Los Olvidados: Images of the Immigrant, Political Power of Noncitizens, and Immigration Law and
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citizen would never be subject to deportation and would never be
faced with Ms. Santiago's dilemma. Moreover, generally, a citizen
would be able to avail herself of an effective remedy in the face of
intentional or negligent government deception because she would
be entitled to have her conviction vacated, and she would be al-
lowed to enter a new plea. In contrast, a noncitizen lacks such a
remedy because Congress's recent enactment of the IIRIRA effec-
tively deprives any court of jurisdiction over deportation orders."
Our hypothetical Ms. Santiago potentially represents many others
who will never get their day in court as Congress "clear[s] the
decks" 9 of pending cases covered by the new statute. Like Ms. San-
tiago, many of these former government witnesses may be exposed
to grave bodily harm after being deported to their home countries
when the U.S. government fails to live up to its promises. If there is
one principle for which the Bill of Rights stands, it is limiting gov-
ernment action against persons, especially when the government
fails to follow rules of fair play in the enforcement of its laws. ° Yet
this foundational principle of fair play does not protect Ms. Santi-
ago.
Enforcement, 1993 BYU L. REv. 1139, 1146 [hereinafter Johnson, Los Olvidados] (discussing
the difficulties faced by immigrants in both the political and judicial spheres); Michael A.
Olivas, The Chronicles, My Grandfather's Stories, and Immigration Law: The Slave Traders Chronicle
as Racial History, 34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 425 (1990) (comparing the immigration histories of
Native Americans, Chinese, and Mexicans in America); Margaret H. Taylor, Detained Aliens
Challenging Conditions of Confinement and the Porous Border of the Plenary Power Doctrine, 22
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1087 (1995) (describing the treatment of immigrants held in U.S.
detention centers); Patricia Zavella, The Tables Are Turned: Immigration, Poverty, and Social
Conflict in California Communities, in IMMIGRANTS OUT!: THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-
IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES 136 (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997) [hereinafter
IMMIGRANTS OUT!] (describing the rise of social conflict in California in the face of in-
creased immigration and a changing economy).
7. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262-63 (1971) (holding that the
government's failure to abide by a promise that induces a guilty plea requires that the con-
viction be vacated and the case remanded to the lower court).
8. See IIRIRA § 306(a), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-612 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 12 5 2(g) (Supp. 111996)). Section 1252 now reads, in pertinent part,
as follows:
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION.-Except as provided in this section and notwithstand-
ing any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or
claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney
General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders
against alien under [the INA].
Id. § 1252(g) (Supp. 11 1996).
9. Ramallo v. Reno, 114 F.3d 1210,1213 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Ramallo II1).
10. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. V (right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures), V (right to due process), VI (right to counsel), VII (right to a jury trial), VIII
(right to be free from cruel and unusual punishments), XIV, § 1 (right to equal protection
of the laws).
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This horrible result arises from the distinctions our country
draws between the citizen and noncitizen. At first blush, differenti-
ating between citizen and foreigner appears reasonable. Indeed,
any sovereign nation should have the power to determine who
qualifies to join its polity. In fact, the power to distinguish between
citizen and noncitizen rests in the U.S. Constitution's charge that
Congress create a "uniform Rule of Naturalization.""' The framers,
however, surely did not intend or foresee the disastrous conse-
quences of the citizen/noncitizen distinction for foreigners such as
Ms. Santiago, especially in the context of promise enforcement
cases. Although immigration consequences flow from the govern-
ment's breach of its promise, the essential purpose of the
cooperation agreement is to facilitate law enforcement, not to
regulate immigration. 2 It would be easy to attribute Ms. Santiago's
fateful plight to the doctrine of unintended consequences, 3 but
the consequences may be particularly grave in this instance. A con-
scientious America must ensure that such consequences do not
materialize.
How did we get here? Why does current immigration and due
process law allow for such an unjust outcome? More importantly,
how can we work to avoid such undesirable results? This Article
seeks to answer these important questions by examining current
immigrants' rights theory, reviewing recent due process case law
on promise enforcement suits, and borrowing from ProfessorJody
Armour's theories on enhancing legal decision-making and recent
psychological research on people's attitudes toward new immigrant
groups. By recognizing that, like racial stereotypes, immigrant group
stereotypes have been used to create a permanent out-group of non-
citizens, American society can begin to retreat from its current
xenophobic stance and adopt policies that value the inherent hu-
manity of all. Citizens might start this process by demanding
Congress repeal the "court-stripping" provisions of the IIRIRA, thus
providing a check on the government's reneging on cooperation
agreements made with noncitizens like Ms. Santiago.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
12. See, e.g., Thomas v. INS, 35 F.2d 1332, 1337 (9th Cir. 1994) (analogizing the coop-
eration agreement to a traditional plea agreement).
13. See generally Thomas 0. Depperschmidt, Unintended Consequences and Perverse Effects
in Forensic Economic Award Calculations, J. LEGAL ECON., Summer 1994, at 65, 65
("[U]nintended consequences contain actions yielding a variety of unplanned results, often
somewhat serendipitously."); cf generally Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended
Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1390 (1994) (describing the unintended consequences that
result from well-meaning campaign finance regulations). Of course, my use of the term
here is not so benign.
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Part I examines the history of several immigrant groups in the
United States and the current legal theories that explain how and
why American law draws distinctions between the citizen and non-
citizen. American history reveals, and contemporary scholars
assert, that there are two competing views of noncitizens' rights in
U.S. law: one views the noncitizen as someone not entitled to con-
stitutional protection (the "membership" paradigm), and the
other values the personhood of the noncitizen and the citizen
equally and thus entitles the noncitizen to constitutional protec-
tion (the "personhood" paradigm). Professor Michael Scaperlanda
argues that courts view membership claims as superior to person-
hood claims. He advocates that citizens seek strategies to ensure
that constitutional notions of personhood are not forgotten in our
discussions of polity membership. Part II looks at three recent
promise enforcement suits like Ms. Santiago's and illustrates how
current theories of membership and personhood may be used to
explain the results in those cases. Drawing from contemporary
critical race theory and social psychology research about invidious
immigrant group stereotypes, Part III begins the membership dia-
logue Scaperlanda suggests in an effort to move away from ideas of
segregation, alienation, and subordination to those of integration,
acceptance, and equality. Specifically, this Part contends that by
acknowledging the existence of anti-immigrant stereotypes in con-
temporary society, citizens might reconstruct their image of the
noncitizen deportee by calling for the repeal of the IIRIRA's court-
stripping provisions and by insisting that the federal government
abide by its promises and respect the noncitizen's equal person-
hood.
I. HISTORICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES
ON IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS
Despite the rapid globalization of the world economy, the
countries of terra firma are unlikely to abandon the concept of
individual, sovereign nations in favor of a world of free borders
and unrestricted migration. 14 Thus, every sovereign nation will
14. Note, however, that some scholars have argued for open border immigration poli-
cies for the United States and elsewhere. See, e.g.,Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The
Case for Open Borders, 49 REv. OF POL. 251, 252 (1987) (finding support for open borders
from the assumption that individuals are of equal moral worth); R. George Wright, Federal
Immigration Law and the Case for Open Entry, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1265, 1265 (1994) ("[A]
FALL 1998]
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continue to struggle with immigration and naturalization policy
in an effort to decide who should join the polity and enjoy all
the rights and privileges of citizenship and who should be ex-
cluded.1
5
For the United States, the immigration issue is particularly
difficult because two competing values lie at the core of
American legal history and culture: the conception of the
United States as an immigrant nation and the notion of limiting
resources and rights to U.S. citizens only. Images of the former
include the Statue of Liberty, Ellis Island,' 6 the poetry of Emma
Lazarus,17 multiculturalism, ' and the melting pot concept.' 9 In
contrast, the latter notion conjures up visions of the Chinese
Exclusion Act,20 World War II internment camps, current anti-
carefully crafted version of an open entry policy need not involve costs to current citizens so
substantial as to practically disqualify such a policy.").
15. The European Community might be the exception to this statement. Under the
Treaty on European Union, the community has begun to experiment with a single immi-
gration policy governing movement of union nationals within the member states. See Treaty
on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 8a, § 1, 31 L.L.M. 247, 259; Giovanna I. Wolf, Note,
Efforts Toward "An Ever Closer" European Union Confront Immigration Barriers, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 223, 223 (1996).
16. See NewJersey v. NewYork, 118 S. Ct. 1726, 1733 (1998) (discussing Ellis Island's
role in U.S. immigration from 1892 until 1954).
17. Emma Lazarus's words adorn the pedestal of Lady Liberty: "Give me your tired,
your poor, / Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, / The wretched refuse of your
teeming shore. / Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me, / I lift my lamp beside the
golden door!" Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus, in THE POEMS OF EMMA LAZARUS 203
(1888).
18. See generally THOMAS J. LA BELLE & CHRISTOPHER R. WARD, MULTICULTURALISM
AND EDUCATION: DIVERSITY AND ITS IMPACT ON SCHOOLS AND SOCIETY (1994) (evaluating
the desirability of multicultural education through an analysis of history, immigration, and
culture). La Belle and Ward believe that "multiethnic and multiracial societies should make
efforts to ensure equity and justice for individuals whose minority background, physical
features, economic status, and goals differ from dominant groups." Id. at 1. They also be-
lieve that societies need to use "differences in lifestyles, values, and beliefs as a means to
enrich all individuals and groups by studying other cultures, learning other languages, es-
tablishing fair and equitable methods of treatment, and generally making an effort to
understand the behavior and thought of others through their eyes and value systems." Id.
This Article attempts to provide one method by which citizens can learn to value nonciti-
zens' personhood by examining recent social psychology research on perceptions of out-
groups. See discussion infra Part III.
19. See Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64
N.C. L. REV. 303, 311-13 (1986) (discussing the origins of the melting pot concept in U.S.
history).
20. Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed 1943).
21. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944) (upholding order
excluding persons ofJapanese ancestry from areas on the West Coast during World War II);
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100-02 (1943) (determining that World War II
curfew order directed at persons of Japanese ancestry did not unconstitutionally discrimi-
nate against U.S. citizens of Japanese ancestry); Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115, 117
(1943) (upholding conviction of American-born person of Japanese descent for violating
[VOL. 32:1
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Asian violence,22  Proposition 187,3 and welfare reform. 4 Not
surprisingly, the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the area of
curfew order in light of Hirabayashi); see also PETER IRONS, JUSTICE DELAYED: THE RECORD
OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES (1989) (collecting materials discussing
Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui). The irony of the internment camps is that most of those
interned were American citizens who were perceived to be foreigners. See MICHI WEGLYN,
YEARS OF INFAMY: THE UNTOLD STORY OF AMERICA'S CONCENTRATION CAMPS 29 (1976)
("[O]f those interned some 73 percent were American citizens, born in this country and
entitled to the full protection of our laws. These citizens were imprisoned for no reason
other than their race."); see also infra note 44.
22. While anti-Asian violence has long been a sad part of America's history, one recent
incident galvanized the Asian-American community: the 1982 killing of Vincent Chin. Chin
was a young Chinese-American engineer who "was brutally beaten to death with a baseball
bat by two white auto workers who thought he was Japanese and blamed him for the reces-
sion of the Anerican auto industry." NATIONAL ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICAN LEGAL
CONSORTIUM, 1995 AUDIT OF VIOLENCE AGAINST ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICANS: THE CONSE-
QUENCES OF INTOLERANCE IN AMERICA 6 (1996). Chin's killers served no jail time. See id.
23. Proposition 187 is a California initiative that restricts undocumented immigrants'
access to various state benefits. See Lolita K. Buckner Inniss, California's Proposition 187-Does
It Mean What It Says? Does It Say What It Means? A Textual and Constitutional Analysis, 10 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 577, 617-22 (1996) (describing provisions of Proposition 187). California vot-
ers passed the proposition in 1994 with a fifty-nine percent to forty-one percent vote. See id.
at 578. Racially-tinged appeals to American patriotism were typical of the campaign to pass
the initiative. See, e.g., Letter to the Editor, Illegal Students Given Preferential Coverage, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 30, 1994, at B16, available in 1994 WL 2360440 ("[T]he state of California is not
a province of Mexico. The victory of Proposition 187 will be proof that the state of Califor-
nia belongs to the United States of America."). Through correspondence with the Author,
Professor Kevin Johnson has suggested that "Proposition 187, which limited benefits to
undocumented immigrants, was simply a precursor to the limitation of benefits to legal immi-
grants as well," as evidenced by the 1996 welfare reform bill. Letter from Kevin R. Johnson,
Professor, University of California, Davis, to Victor C. Romero, Associate Professor, Dickin-
son School Law 2 (Sept. 8, 1997) (emphasis added) (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform). Thus, the anti-immigrant sentiment behind Proposition 187 was not
limited to "illegal aliens." See Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics, Popular De-
mocracy, and California's Proposition 187: The Political Relevance and Legal Irrelevance of Race, 70
WASH. L. REV. 629, 651 (1995) ("It also is possible that the passage of Proposition 187 re-
sulted from sheer frustration with immigration.").
24. Last year's welfare reform bill included a provision that would deny "aliens" cer-
tain welfare benefits. See Restricting Welfare and Public Benefits for Aliens, Pub. L. No. 105-
33, tit. V, subtit. D, 111 Stat. 251, 597-603 (1998). The INS has seen a surge in the number of
citizen applications as a result of this and other anti-immigrant measures. SeeWilliam Booth,
In a Rush, New Citizens Register Their Political Interest, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 1996, at Al
("[T]he anti-immigrant mood of the country is pushing many to become citizens."); Matt
McKinney, Welfare Reform Spurs Citizenship "Panic," PROVIDENCE J. BULL., Sept. 24, 1996, at
CI, available in 1996 WL 12465785 ("Applications nationwide have climbed sharply. Immi-
gration officials received more than I million applications for citizenship between Oct. 1,
1994, and Sept. 30, 1995, the fiscal year for the INS. That was a 300 percent increase over
1994.").
This year, recent efforts by the Clinton administration to repeal some of the anti-
immigrant welfare measures have relieved some of the panic among immigrants rushing to
become citizens. See Annie Nakao, Rush to Become Citizens Slowing, Aid Groups Say Many Immi-
grants Believe Threatened Benefits Won't Be Taken Away AfterAl4 S.F. EXAMINER,July 30, 1997, at
A5. Immigrants' rights groups, however, are continuing to urge noncitizens to naturalize, in
case Congress decides to pass other anti-immigrant legislation. See id. In the meantime, a
federal district judge in New York recently upheld, against an equal protection challenge,
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noncitizens' rights illustrates this dichotomy between the
celebration of immigrants' personhood and the denial of equal
status for noncitizens.
In an effort to better understand the challenges U.S. citizens
face in balancing the need to restrict membership in this country
against the interest in protecting the rights of all people who en-
ter, Part A briefly examines the history of three immigrant groups
in America and the competing theories underlying the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence.
A. A Historical Perspective: Non-English Whites,
Chinese, and Mexican Immigrants
Throughout American history, immigration and alienage law
has reflected a tension between welcoming the immigrant as a
person entitled to the same legal protections and benefits as citi-
zens and denigrating the immigrant as one outside the circle of
national membership. To illustrate this tension, this section will
briefly discuss how three groups in the United States' history-
the non-English whites, the Chinese, and the Mexicans-have
been treated alternately as insiders and outsiders by the United
States' citizenry. In reviewing this history, two patterns emerge.
Where the out-group can be characterized by the majority as pos-
sessing attributes similar to the majority's or as helping to further
the majority's interests, then discrimination abates. Where the
out-group is viewed as different and threatening, however, dis-
crimination escalates.
1. Non-English European Immigration-In early America, there
was no federal immigration law as it currently exists today. Rather,
America was "the New World," free to be populated by those flee-
ing religious persecution in Europe.2' In the 1700s, many of the
the Welfare Reform Act's provisions disqualifying many lawful permanent residents from
receiving supplemental security income benefits and food stamps. See Abreu v. Callahan,
971 F. Supp. 799, 821 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). For a more detailed analysis of the welfare reform
legislation, see generally Michael Scaperlanda, Who Is My Neighbor?: An Essay on Immigrants,
Welfare Reform, and the Constitution, 29 CONN. L. REv. 1587 (1997) (explaining the effect of
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 on resident
aliens); Charles Wheeler, The New Alien Restrictions on Public Benefits: The Full Impact Remains
Uncertain, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1245 (1996) (arguing that the language of the Per-
sonal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 remains open to
interpretation but will likely have the greatest negative impact on resident alien children
and the elderly and states with large resident alien populations).
25. Although he acknowledges that there was neither a quantitative restriction on
immigration nor a federal mandate against it, Professor Gerald Neuman contends that
[VOL. 32:1
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immigrants were of English or Scottish descent, often members of
dissenting Protestant sects. 2 6 Tied by a bond of common culture
and purpose, many of these new settlers came to prefer things
English2 7 and likely felt no need to discourage immigration of oth-
ers like themselves. With the influx of other Europeans, however-
the non-English, the poor, the Catholics, the Jews-the first wave
of immigrants began to resent the newcomers' intrusion and made
them feel unwelcome. s Interestingly, early "immigration law" re-
stricted entry into the various states rather than into America itself.
These state-imposed rules differed from modern federal immigra-
tion law in that the former applied to other states' citizens as well
as to foreigners and were often ostensibly concerned with regulat-
ing the spread of disease or with crime rather than with excluding
undesirable non-English Europeans.29 Similarly, the first federal
immigration laws enacted in the late 1800s appeared to be racially
and ethnically neutral s0 although anti-Catholic sentiment was
rampant.31
Over time, however, the English settlers began to accept the
non-English.32 Despite the initial classification of the non-English
as "the other," ultimately the Europeans' shared "whiteness" con-
stituted a sufficient basis for constructing a unified community
with a new "other," the non-Whites. Congress might have fore-
shadowed this eventual merger of the English and non-English
whites in 1790 when it restricted naturalization to "white persons,"
qualitative restrictions on transborder movement existed, primarily at the state level and
supplemented by federal legislation. See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTI-
TUTION 19 (1996).
26. SeeJoe R. Feagin, Old Poison in New Bottles: The Deep Roots of Modern Nativisnm, in IM-
MIGRANTS OUT!, supra note 6, at 15.
27. See id. at 15-16.
28. See id. at 17.
29. See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY 1
(3d ed. 1995) (noting that early immigration law restricted entry by other states' citizens
and foreigners and also regulated specific concerns such as public health); see also NEUMAN,
supra note 25, at 21-34 (describing restrictionist policies by various colonies, including the
control of disease and the entry of convicts).
30. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (repealed 1974); Act of Aug. 3, 1882,
ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214 (1883); see alsoALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 29, at 2 ("The first federal
statutes limiting immigration, enacted in 1875 and 1882, prohibited the entry of criminals,
prostitutes, idiots, lunatics, and persons likely to become a public charge.").
31. See Feagin, supra note 26, at 19, 21-22, 25.
32. See id. at 25 ("The Irish, however, did share certain cultural mores with the English
and most did assimilate relatively easily to many aspects of the dominant culture."). On the
concept of "whiteness" as a social construct, see generally IAN F. HANEY L6PEZ, WHITE BY
LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996).
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thus formally recognizing the common bond between the two
33groups.
2. Chinese Immigration-Like the non-English whites, the Chi-
nese in America have also experienced membership in the in-
group and out-group. Initially brought to California to work on
the railways, Chinese laborers outlived their usefulness in the
eyes of the European-Americans once the transcontinental rail-
road was completed.34 In the ensuing Panic of 1873, a drought
and the depression of 1877, the Chinese became easy targets of
anti-immigrant sentiment.35 In the 1880s, Congress passed the so-
called "Chinese Exclusion Laws,"36 which were designed to prohibit
• • • 37
Chinese immigration. Further, in Chae Chan Ping v. United
States,8 the U.S. Supreme Court held that Congress possessed ple-
nary constitutional power over immigration and therefore could
exclude noncitizens on the basis of race. 39 The plenary power doc-
trine was born with this decision, and it has remained a resilient,
33. SeeAct of Mar. 26,1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (1845) (repealed 1795). Feagin correctly
notes, however, that white-on-white ethnic conflict has riot completely disappeared from
American society, citing 1984 vice-presidential candidate Geraldine Ferraro's and former
New York Governor Mario Cuomo's need to defend themselves against allegations that
their Italian heritage suggested Mafia links. See Feagin, supra note 26, at 27. Unfortunately,
the often white-on-white prejudice of anti-Semitism still also occurs. See id. at 27-28.
34. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 29, at 2.
35. See id. Authors disagree as to whether the Chinese were consigned to the margins
of society from the outset or whether they were gradually resented as their numbers grew.
Compare id. at 2-3 ("The Chinese had been victims of discriminatory legislation in California
since the r850's. They were subjected to entry, license and occupation taxes, originally to
raise money for the California treasury and later as a means to deter immigration."), and
HYUNG-CHAN KIM, A LEGAL HISTORY OF ASIAN AMERICANS, 1790-1990 47 (1994) ("[Tlhe
Chinese became immediate targets of both legal and extralegal actions taken by white min-
ers against them to discourage their presence in California."), with MARY ROBERTS
COOLIDGE, CHINESE IMMIGRATION 21 (1909) (describing Chinese as having been
"welcomed, praised and considered almost indispensable"). For more on the early history
of the Chinese in America, see generally Lucy E. SALYER, LAw HARSH As TIGERS: CHINESE
IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAw (1995); Charles McClain,Jr.,
The Chinese Struggle for Civil Rights in Nineteenth Century America: The First Phase, 1850-1870,
72 CAL. L. REv. 529 (1984).
36. See Act of Nov. 3., 1893, ch. 14, 28 Stat. 7 (repealed 1943); Act of May 5, 1892, ch.
60, 27 Stat. 25 (repealed 1943); Act of Oct. 1, 1888, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504 (repealed 1943);
Act of Sept. 13, 1888, ch. 1015, 25 Stat. 476 (repealed 1943); Act ofJuly 5, 1884, ch. 220, 23
Stat. 115 (repealed 1943); Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943).
37. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 29, at 2 (discussing the history of Chinese immi-
gration); see also KiM, supra note 35, at 70-91 (discussing the statutes and court cases
regarding Chinese exclusion); Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discrimina-
tion and the Constitutional Law oflmmigration, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1, 12-16 (1998) (discussing
the plenary power doctrine arising out of the Chinese exclusion cases).
38. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
39. See id. at 601-11.
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important organizing principle of immigration law.40 Justice Field
chillingly captured the nativists' view of the Chinese as the
"outsider" during that time:
The differences of race added greatly to the difficulties of the
situation.... (T] hey remained strangers in the land, residing
apart by themselves, and adhering to the customs and usages
of their own country. It seemed impossible for them to assimi-
late with our people or to make any change in their habits or
modes of living. As they grew in numbers each year the peo-
ple of the coast saw, or believed they saw, in the facility of
immigration, and in the crowded millions of China, where
population presses upon the means of subsistence, great dan-
ger that at no distant day that portion of our country would
be overrun by them ....
After classifying the Chinese as the "outsider," Justice Field
found it easy to justify their harsh treatment at the hands of the
government:
If, therefore, the government of the United States, through its
legislative department, considers the presence of foreigners
of a different race in this country, who will not assimilate with
us, to be dangerous to its peace and security, their exclusion
is not to be stayed because at the time there are no actual hos-
tilities with the nation of which the foreigners are subjects.42
Like the non-English whites before them, the Chinese were
viewed as outsiders who chose not to assimilate into the American
culture and who therefore posed a threat to the security of the ma-
jority. According to the Court's analysis, there were only two ways
by which the perceived threat of "invasion" could be abated:
40. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and
the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925, 925-26 (1995) [hereinafter Legomsky, Ten More
Years]; see also Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1,
3 (1984) ("Classical immigration law proved to be remarkably durable.").
Many scholars have called for the dismantling of the plenary power doctrine and have been
disappointed by its continued acceptance. See Legomsky, Ten More Years, supra, at 936-37
(predicting future erosion and emasculation of the plenary power doctrine); see also Ste-
phen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 Sup.
CT. REv. 255, 303, 305 [hereinafter Legomsky, Immigration Law] (predicting that the ple-
nary power doctrine will eventually be frankly disavowed); Frank H. Wu, The Limits of
Borders: A Moderate Proposal for Immigration Reform, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv., Summer 1996, at
35, 35 (calling for elimination of the plenary power doctrine).
41. Ping, 130 U.S. at 595.
42. Id. at 606.
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through assimilation (the route traversed by the non-English
whites) or through exclusion. Viewing the Chinese as incapable of
assimilating to the white culture, the dominant majority chose ex-
clusion.43 Just as the English settlers used facially objective laws to
keep social "undesirables" out of the colonies, the white majority
utilized the fiction of sovereign power to justify its overtly racist
policies.4
Despite the continued prejudice and violence against Chinese-
Americans today,5 the dominant society has come to view the
Chinese as having assimilated in some areas of American life. For
example, Chinese and other East Asians often do very well on
college entrance examinations and are viewed as "model minor-
ity" groups that succeed by virtue of traditional "American" values
like industry and loyalty.46 Thus, just as the non-English whites have
43. Anti-Asian sentiment in America historically has affected groups other than the
Chinese. Americans of Japanese heritage also suffered the indignity of exclusion and isola-
tion by being interned in camps during World War II, while Americans of German and
Italian descent remained free. See Neil Gotanda, Asian American Rights and the "Miss Saigon
Syndrome," in ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1087,
1098 (Hyung-chan Kim ed., 1992) ("The evacuated Japanese Americans, including U.S.
citizens, were presumed to be sufficiently foreign for an inference by the military that such
racial-foreigners might be disloyal.... With the presence of racial foreignness, a presump-
tion of disloyalty was reasonable and natural."); see also Neil Gotanda, "Other Non-Whites" in
American Legal History: A Review ofJUSTICE AT WAR, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1186, 1190-92 (1985)
(book review) (discussing Korematsu and other wartime "concentration camp cases").
44. See Ibrahim J. Wani, Truth, Strangers, and Fiction: The Illegitimate Uses of Legal Fiction
in Immigration Law, 11 CARDOZO L. REv. 51, 83 (1989) ("There is also a sinister ideological
purpose served by the fiction of sovereignty. The Court was undoubtedly caught up in the
nativist xenophobia of the era.... The fiction of sovereignty masked the Court's underlying
bigotry by providing the decision with a seemingly objective disinfectant.") (footnote omit-
ted). By drawing analogies between the experiences of the non-English whites and the
Chinese, I do not mean to ignore the role racism played in the subordination of the Chi-
nese. I compare these two groups, however, not to determine which has suffered more, but
to emphasize the injustices that both sets of newcomers endured at the hands of the earlier
arrivals, themselves European immigrants.
45. See supra note 22 (discussing the murder of Vincent Chin).
46. In an interesting twist in group dynamics, some universities have placed ceilings
on Asian-American admissions to increase admissions of members of other racial groups. See
generally Pat K. Chew, Asian Americans: The "Reticent" Majority and Their Paradoxes, 36 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1 (1994) (discussing treatment of Asian Americans in university admission
policies and the distortions in societal perceptions that lead to this treatment); Grace W.
Tsuang, Note, Assuring Equal Access of Asian Americans to Highly Selective Universities, 98 YALE
L.J. 659 (1989) (discussing admission ceilings on Asian-Americans at some universities).
Such admission ceilings have led some Asian-Americans to question affirmative action poli-
cies as anti-Asian, generating much scholarly commentary. See, e.g., Frank H. Wu, Neither
Black nor White: Asian Americans and Affirmative Action, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 225 (1995)
(arguing that Asian-Americans have become pawns in the affirmative action debate because
of their success in the American education system); Selena Dong, Note, "Too Many Asians".
The Challenge of Fighting Discrimination Against Asian-Americans and Preserving Affirmative Ac-
tion, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1027 (1995) (proposing constitutional arguments for Chinese-
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assimilated into the dominant culture, the Chinese have been ac-
cepted where they have reflected values held by American society.
3. Mexican Immigration-Mexican laborers, like the Chinese
coolies before them, have been welcomed and shunned at differ-
ent times based upon their perceived usefulness by the larger
American majority. While the Chinese were imported to build rail-
roads, the Mexicans concentrated on agricultural work, mostly in
the southwestern United States.47 Based on economic demand for
their services, the Mexicans alternately were recruited through
formal and informal immigration arrangements4 and rejected by
American agricultural businesses.
U.S. immigration policy frequently has reflected business
demand for Mexican labor. For example, World War II created an
increased need for agricultural workers. Accordingly, the United
States negotiated a treaty with Mexico, popularly known as the
"Bracero Program," under which Mexican citizens were temporarily
allowed entry into the United States to work on agricultural
lands. 9 Once the United States government realized that it could
not control its businesses' continued recruitment of cheaper,
undocumented non-Bracero labor, however, the INS initiated
"Operation Wetback" in 1954 to expel over 1,000,000 un-
documented Mexican workers. 5° Rather than designing a coherent
immigration policy that also punished American businesses for
hiring undocumented immigrants, the federal government forced
the workers to bear the ignominy of deportation." In 1986, some
American students who must meet higher admission standards at a San Francisco high
school because enrollment exceeded desegregation quotas).
47. See Olivas, supra note 6, at 432-41 (comparing the immigration histories of the
Chinese and Mexicans in America).
48. Professor Gerald L6pez asserts that while the evidence is incomplete, early com-
mentaries support his conclusion that "the majority of Mexicans recruited after the 1880s
were undocumented." Gerald P. L6pez, Undocumented Mexican Migration: In Search of a Just
Immigration Law and Policy, 28 UCLA L. Rav. 615, 668 & n.302 (1981).
49. See Agreement Respecting the Temporary Migration of Mexican Agricultural
Workers, Aug. 4, 1942, U.S.-Mex., 56 Stat. 1759, 1766 [hereinafter Bracero Program]; see also
L6pez, supra note 48, at 664-67 (discussing the Bracero Program).
50. See L6pez, supra note 48, at 670; see also ELIZABETH HULL, WITHOUT JUSTICE FOR
ALL 84-85 (1985) (describing Operation Wetback); Olivas, supra note 6, at 438-39 (same).
51. See L6pez, supra note 48, at 707-08. L6pez states:
If we were really serious about making ... a [sic] effective deterrent to undocu-
mented entry, we might be able to do something about it.... [T]here is no reason to
suppose that sanctioning those employing undocumented Mexicans would be inef-
fective.... [but] sanctions would harm the economic interests of employers and the
documented population.
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thirty years after Operation Wetback, Congress decided to amend
the INA to include employer sanctions for hiring undocumented
persons. 2 Rather than value and respect the industry of Mexican
workers, many of whom have toiled in agricultural jobs not taken
by citizens, 5" the United States has often affirmed the primacy of
one's legal immigration status over one's desire to put in an
honest day's work.
5 4
Even the most cursory review of the immigration histories of the
non-English whites, the Chinese, and the Mexicans in the United
States reveals that their acceptance by the dominant culture, both
inside and outside the law, depended greatly on their perceived
similarity or usefulness to the larger society. The non-English
whites shared their skin color and some cultural mores with the
original English settlers; the Chinese were able to excel scholasti-
cally; the Mexicans provided vital, inexpensive agricultural labor.
Just as each immigrant group has achieved varying degrees of ac-
55ceptance, the United States' immigration policies toward group
members have vacillated depending on the citizenry's ability to
52. See Immigration Control and Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, tit. I, § 10,
INA § 274A, 100 Stat. 3360-74 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (1994)). Section
1324a makes it "unlawful for a person or other entity [] to hire, or to recruit or refer for a
fee, for employment in the United States [a noncitizen] knowing the [noncitizen] is an
unauthorized [noncitizen] ... with respect to such employment.. . ." Id. § 1324a(a) (1) (A).
53. Professor Kevin Johnson describes this attitude toward Mexican workers as
"schizophrenic": "On the one hand, Mexicans often are characterized as hardworking and
performing labor that many 'Americans' will not. On the other hand, they serve as conven-
ient scapegoats when the U.S. economy turns for the worse." Kevin Johnson, The New
Nativism: Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, Something Blue, in IMMIGRANTS
OUT!, supra note 6, at 165, 171 (endnotes omitted).
54. As one subway commuter acknowledged in a recent New York Times article about
undocumented immigrant workers: "These guys work very hard, even if they are here ille-
gally." Clyde Haberman, Immigrants: In Plain Sight, but Not Seen, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1997, at
BI; see also Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the Undocumented
Worker Under United States Law, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 955 (discussing the identity of undocu-
mented workers in the United States).
55. Indeed, some commentators contend that the recent nativism directed at nonciti-
zens of color may be more resilient than that directed at their white counterparts:
Many of today's "legal" and "illegal" immigrants are people of color, especially from
Mexico. As has been the case with past immigrant generations, they have been sub-
ject to discrimination. Unlike their European predecessors, however, the animus
directed at the new immigrants may enjoy greater resilience. The color of their skin
indefinitely ensures their weakness in the political process, even for those "illegals"
who navigate the arduous process to become "legal."
Johnson, Los Olvidados, supra note 6, at 1145 (citations omitted); see also Robert S. Chang,
A Meditation on Borders, in IMMIGRANTS OUT!, supra note 6, at 244, 245 (discussing the con-
cept of nativistic racism as it applies to discrimination against Asian-Americans).
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recognize in the noncitizens values held by the dominant Ameri-
can culture.
This section has examined the historical tension between the
acceptance and rejection of the foreigner by the citizen. The next
section will examine how the Supreme Court's alienage jurispru-
dence reflects this tension. Specifically, the next section describes
two competing paradigms in Supreme Court precedent to explain
the Court's opinions about noncitizens: the membership and per-
sonhood paradigms.
B. A Legal Perspective: Membership Versus Personhood
Two important law review articles succinctly summarize the Su-
preme Court's jurisprudence regarding the membership and
personhood status of immigrants in American society.
In Membership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage Makes,56
Professor Linda Bosniak contends that the Court's alienage deci-
sions may best be understood through the prisms of "separation"
and "convergence. "5' Drawing from the work of political scientist
Michael Walzer," Bosniak describes the separation model59 as one
that assumes that the government's plenary power over immigra-
tion-the admission and exclusion of noncitizens-exists separate
from its limited power over immigrants' personal rights.6' There-
fore, a government that has the power to deny a noncitizen
admission to this country does not have the power to beat a con-
fession out of an immigrant accused of committing a crime.62 The
convergence model asserts the converse: the government's power
over immigration converges with its power over immigrants'
56. Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047 (1994).
57. Id. at 1059.
58. See id. at 1057 (discussing MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF
PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983)).
59. Seeid. at1138.
60. See id. at 1059-65.
61. See id. at 1094-95.
62. See Franco deJerez v. Burgos, 876 F.2d 1038, 1042 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting that the
Constitution guarantees noncitizens the same constitutional rights possessed by citizens
charged with crimes); Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1374 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding
that noncitizens have the right to be free from gross physical abuse at the hands of state or
federal agents).
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rights. 63 For example, the government may fairly restrict the right
to vote to citizens only, but deny the franchise to foreigners.64
Despite these distinctions, Bosniak acknowledges that the
boundary between these two models is not, at the margin, clearly
delineated: "The defining question in the current politics of
[noncitizen] status is just how far the government's power to
regulate immigration legitimately extends., 65 In other words, does
the government's power to deny a foreigner entry into the United
States also include the power to deny the noncitizen access to pub-
lic benefits once in the United States? In the case of our fictional
Ms. Santiago, does the government's immigration power extend so
completely over noncitizens that the government can deny Ms.
Santiago the right to enforce a plea agreement? Ultimately,
Bosniak chooses not to predict how courts will respond to the ever-
increasing number of rights claims by noncitizens in the current
anti-immigrant climate, but she is satisfied that, for now, her two
models .provide a useful framework from which to evaluate these
claims.66
In Partial Membership: Aliens and the Constitutional Community,67
Professor Michael Scaperlanda picks up where Bosniak leaves off.
Using the term "personhood" in place of "separation" and
"membership" in lieu of "convergence," Scaperlanda contends that
the Supreme Court favors membership over personhood. In re-
viewing a noncitizen's rights claim, the Court will first determine
whether membership issues are present.69 If so, then the nonciti-
zen's claim will be summarily denied, and the Court will defer to
the political arm which has chosen to differentiate between citizen
and foreigner. 0 For instance, in Mathews v. Diaz,71 the Court held
that Congress's plenary power over immigration extended into the
realm of the distribution of Medicare benefitsY.' Accordingly, the
Court upheld the statutory scheme that made a noncitizen's length
of continued residence in the United States a condition for par-
63. See Bosniak, supra note 56, at 1138.
64. See infra note 138 and accompanying text (discussing limits on the voting rights of
noncitizens); cf Bosniak, supra note 56, at 1064 (noting that alienage is often a legitimate
basis for denying certain rights to noncitizens).
65. Bosniak, supra note 56, at 1143.
66. See id. at 1148-49.
67. Michael Scaperlanda, Partial Membership: Aliens and the Constitutional Community, 81
IOWA L. REv. 707 (1996).
68. See id. at 716, 752.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 716.
71. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
72. See id. at 80 (applying rational basis review to the federal alienage classification).
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ticipation in a federal medical insurance program. 73 Diaz was not a
citizen, so Congress could legitimately exercise its plenary immi-
gration power over him to deny him certain federal benefits.74 His
claim of personhood did not trump his status as a foreigner.
If membership is not an issue, however, then the Court closely
scrutinizes the discriminatory governmental conduct, often validat-
ing the noncitizen's claim to equal personhood.7'5 In another
benefits case, Graham v. Richardson,16 the Court invalidated an Ari-
zona statute that deprived noncitizens of certain welfare benefits,
stating that "classifications based on alienage, like those based on
nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close ju-
dicial scrutiny.' '77 In Graham, national membership was not an
issue; therefore, Arizona, which, unlike Congress, possesses no
plenary power over immigration, could not deny noncitizens their
rights to equal personhood absent a compelling reason.8 Equal
personhood trumps governmental claims where national member-
79
ship is a non-issue.
Given the Court's preference for the membership model, Sca-
perlanda argues for a redefinition of the debate over membership
from one that pits the plenary power of the legislature against the
noncitizen's claim to equal rights, to a debate that weighs the
rights of the citizenry "to create a constitutional community
s°
against the rights of the noncitizen to equal personhood. Scaper-
landa cites the Court's "political function" cases to illustrate his
theory!' In these cases, the Court found that a state's right to de-
fine who is part of its community overrides any personhood claims
the noncitizen might have. 2 For example, in Cabell v. Chavez-
Salido,3 the Court sustained a California requirement that all
peace officers be citizens.84 The Court stated the following:
[The] exclusion of [noncitizens] from basic governmental
processes is not a deficiency in the democratic system but a
necessary consequence of the community's process of political
73. See id. at 83-84.
74. See id. at 84.
75. See Scaperlanda, supra note 67, at 716, 752.
76. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
77. Id. at 372 (citations omitted).
78. See Scaperlanda, supra note 67, at 731 & n.126.
79. See id. at 716.
80. Id. at 769.
81. See id. at 767-71.
82. See id. at 769-70.
83. 454 U.S. 432 (1984).
84. See id. at 447.
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self-definition. Self-government ... begins by defining the
scope of the community of the governed and thus of the gov-
ernors as well: [noncitizens] are by definition those outside of
this community."
Scaperlanda specifically cites this passage in Cabell to emphasize
that the Court should justify its preference for membership over
personhood only when membership involves the citizenry's attempt
at self-definition in accordance with constitutional mandates.6 Thus,
Scaperlanda maintains, the current plenary power or the "inherent
sovereign power" paradigm is essentially unbounded 7 His alterna-
tive-a model that requires that communal formation be
tempered by the Constitution and then weighed against the non-
citizen's personhood claim-forces the government to recognize
that it has limited power. The primacy of the Constitution prevents
the government from playing the membership card to trump per-
sonhood.8s
Scaperlanda concludes by calling for a constitutional dialogue
among "We the People." 9 While he questions whether the political
branch will act to protect the rights of noncitizens, 90 he hopes that
the process of engaging in a frank discussion about citizenship and
personal rights will help shape "the place of noncitizens in our so-
ciety ...."9'
85. Id. at 439-40.
86. See Scaperlanda, supra note 67, at 769-71.
87. See id. at 754 ("[T]he membership's core is broad and the political branches re-
ceive wide latitude in formulating its policy.").
88. Arguably, Scaperlanda's reliance on the political function cases begs the issue. If
Scaperlanda seeks to bound both the federal and state governments by the Constitution,
current equal protection law arguably does just that. Even in cases where membership is an
issue, the Court has employed, for the most part, a rational basis test to scrutinize the gov-
ernment action. See Scaperlanda, supra note 67, at 731-34. While this may not seem like
much scrutiny, it remains constitutional scrutiny nonetheless. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S.
67, 81--82 (1976) ("The reasons that preclude judicial review of political questions also
dictate a narrow standard of review of decisions made by the Congress or the President in
the area of immigration and naturalization.") (citations omitted). In correspondence I have
received from him, Scaperlanda responds that he is concerned that the current rational
basis review undervalues the personhood interests of the noncitizen. See Electronic Mail
from Michael Scaperlanda, Professor, University of Oklahoma Law Center, to Victor C.
Romero, Associate Professor, Dickinson School of Law (Dec. 12, 1997) (on file with Univer-
sity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). I agree with that assessment and, in fact, argue for
greater judicial scrutiny of alienage classifications within the immigration law context. See
Romero, Congruence, supra note t, at 441-54.
89. See Scaperlanda, supra note 67, at 771.
90. Kevin Johnson has expressed a similar fear that the U.S. citizenry will be unsympa-
thetic to noncitizen concerns. SeeJohnson, Los Olvidados, supra note 6, at 1147.
91. Scaperlanda, supra note 67, at 771 n.352. Certainly, the public could decide to
amend the Constitution to eliminate the distinction between citizen and noncitizen. So
long as the United States and other nations favor territorial boundaries over borderless
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Part II, through its discussion of the recent promise enforce-
ment cases, provides one recent example of how membership
preempts personhood and how Scaperlanda's fears of an unsympa-
thetic Congress have been realized. After acknowledging the
problem that the primacy of membership poses, Part III proposes
a way to engage in the constitutional dialogue Scaperlanda sug-
gests by examining recent research in critical race theory and
social psychology.
II. PERSONHOOD VERSUS MEMBERSHIP:
THE "PROMISE ENFORCEMENT" CASES
A. The Due Process Rights of Noncitizens
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments preclude the federal government and the states, respectively,
from denying life, liberty, or property to any person without due
process." Although the Supreme Court decided long ago that the
term "person" in both amendments applies to certain groups of
noncitizens9 and that noncitizens enjoy a right to trial in criminal
proceedings,9 4 within the context of immigration law, the Court
has been reluctant to ascribe constitutional significance to any
procedural protections granted immigrants in civil deportation
proceedings.
Professor Hiroshi Motomura contends that the Court has not
held that the Constitution requires procedural due process protec-
tion for noncitizens in deportation hearings. Instead, the Court
has relied on subconstitutional statutory interpretations of the
INA 95 that favor the noncitizen. 96 For example, Motomura asserts
jurisdictions, however, the distinction between citizen and noncitizen will remain. See supra
text accompanying notes 14-15. My goal is less ambitious: using the promise enforcement
cases as examples, I seek to convince citizens to value fundamental rights concomitant with
the idea of personhood rather than to assert the primacy of their polity membership.
92. "No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law...." U.S. CONST. amend. V. "No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law...." Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
93. See Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953) (holding that perma-
nent residents are "persons" within the context of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (holding that permanent residents
are "persons" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment).
94. SeeWong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896).
95. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1994).
96. See Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surro-
gates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1625, 1645 (1992) [hereinafter
Motomura, Evolution] ("The few judicial decisions [of the 1950s and 1960s] that fostered
FAL1998]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
that in Woodby v. INS,97 the Court's decision that the applicable INA
statute required the showing of clear and convincing evidence of
deportability, rather than a simple preponderance, incorporated
constitutional due process reasoning, despite the Court's insis-
tence that it was merely engaging in statutory interpretation.9
The Court has been reluctant to apply constitutional law due to
the primacy of the membership paradigm, as embodied in Con-
gress's plenary power over immigration. The use of this paradigm
restricts the Court and renders it reluctant to encroach upon Con-
gressional conceptions of citizenship by erecting constitutional
requirements and barriers. The only way the Court is willing to
subvert Congressional power is through the occasional use of
clandestine subconstitutional due process norms masquerading as
neutral statutory interpretation.
Arguably, the use of what Motomura describes as "phantom" or
surrogate" procedural rules99 to achieve what constitutional norms
of personhood readily accomplish, reinforces the concept of the
noncitizen as the "other" by underenforcing our traditional consti-
tutional norms. Every court decision that favors the membership
paradigm over the personhood theory further alienates the non-
citizen.
The next section describes how the primacy of membership over
personhood can lead a federal court to completely abdicate its role
as protector of the marginalized in deference to legislative concep-
tions of citizenship.
B. Membership Trumps Personhood:
The "Promise Enforcement" Cases
Each of the three cases described below highlights the tensions
between the membership and personhood paradigms in a judicial
milieu that generally favors membership concerns.
1. The Personhood Paradigm Applied: Thomas v. INS-Clive Char-
les Thomas arrived in the United States in 1954 and was admitted
the expansion of procedural due process review did so primarily through statutory interpre-
tation, not constitutional law."); see also Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of
Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE LJ. 545,
564-75 (1990) [hereinafter Motomura, Century] (arguing that the plenary power doctrine
has constrained courts from applying constitutional law in immigration cases).
97. 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
98. See Motomura, Evolution, supra note 96, at 1645 & n. 106 (citing Woodby, 385 U.S. at
284-85).
99. See id. at 1645 n.100.
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as a lawful permanent resident. 00 In 1983, Thomas, still a nonciti-
zen, pled guilty to conspiracy to possess cocaine for sale and was
sentenced to seven years' imprisonment. ' ' Because Thomas coop-
erated with the U.S. Attorney's Office in a major narcotics
investigation, he was released after serving only two years of his
sentence.102
As part of his deal with the government, Thomas entered into a
written cooperation agreement in which he agreed to turn over a
sworn statement about his drug trafficking and to serve as a prose-
cution witness for two years. 10 In exchange, the government
promised to advise Thomas's parole board of his cooperation and
agreed not to oppose motions made by Thomas's attorney for re-
duction of sentence and relief from deportation. 
104
After his conviction, the INS issued an order for Thomas to show
cause why he should not be deported.0 5 Thomas's attorney moved
for discretionary relief under section 212(c) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) . Notwithstanding the government's express
promise not to do so, the INS opposed the request for relief, calling
two witnesses at the immigration court hearing who testified to
Thomas's criminal activities. °7 Despite Thomas's testimony about
his reformed behavior and his cooperation with the government,
the immigration judge denied Thomas's request. Thomas also lost
his appeal before the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).108
Thomas then brought his case before the Ninth Circuit, claim-
ing that the government had violated his due process rights by
reneging on its promise not to contest his motion for relief from
deportation.'0 9 In a 2-1 decision, the Ninth Circuit panel agreed
with Thomas and remanded the case to the immigration judge for
100. See Thomas v. INS, 35 F.3d 1332, 1335 (9th Cir. 1994).
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id. Under the agreement, if the U.S. Attorney determined that Thomas had
lied, the government could terminate the agreement. The government, however, was re-
quired to give Thomas an opportunity to confront his accusers prior to the agreement's
termination. See id.
105. See id. at 1336.
106. See id. INA section 212(c) provides that "[noncitizens] lawfully admitted for per-
manent residence who temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order
of deportation, and who are returning to a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven con-
secutive years, may be admitted in the discretion of the Attorney General .... " 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(c) (1994).
107. See Thomas, 35 F.3d at 1336.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 1336-37.
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a new section 212(c) proceeding for discretionary relief from de-
portation.10
Citing well-known and long-standing Supreme Court precedent,
the Ninth Circuit began the heart of its opinion strongly in Tho-
mas's favor: "It has long been the law that the government's failure
to keep a commitment which induces a guilty plea requires that
judgment be vacated and the case remanded."". Noting that a co-
operation agreement is analogous to a plea agreement, l2 the court
stated that the government would be held to the literal terms of
the agreement and would ordinarily bear responsibility for any
lack of clarity."13 For the agreement to be enforceable, however,
the promisee must rely detrimentally on the promise, and the
promisor must be authorized to make the agreement.1
4
The INS offered two arguments in opposition to Thomas's ap-
peal. First, it contended that the INS was neither a party to the
agreement, nor bound by it, nor did the agreement specify that
the government would not oppose Thomas's request."1 Second, it
"argue [d] that the United States Attorney lacked authority to enter
into an agreement on [behalf of the INS]."I6
The court rejected outright the first argument regarding the
INS's alleged non-participation in the agreement negotiations."7
Although acknowledging the reasonableness of the INS's wish not
to be bound by an agreement crafted without its consultation, the
court nonetheless focused on the harm to Thomas caused by the
U.S. Attorney's gaffe: "Thomas was entitled to performance by the
government of its promise. Moreover, the court stated the fol-
lowing:
The agreement plainly and unambiguously spoke to the issue
of deportation and expressly bound the INS. In the first para-
graph, the agreement says that "Government," designated as
the promisor, "includes its departments, officers, agents, and
agencies." ... The eighth paragraph bound "It]he Govern-
ment," so defined, not to oppose motions for "relief from
deportation to the ... U.S. Immigration Service."... Motions
for relief from deportation are made and heard before the
110. See id. at 1337.
111. Id. (citing Santobello v. NewYork, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971)).
112. See id. (citing United States v. Carrillo, 709 F.2d 35, 36 (9th Cir. 1983)).
113. See id. (citing United States v. Anderson, 970 F.2d 602, 607 (9th Cir. 1992)).
114. See id. (citingJohnson v. Lumpkin, 769 F.2d 630, 633 (9th Cir. 1985)).
115. See id.
116. Id.
117. See id.
118. Id.
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INS, and opposed by INS lawyers, so this particular promise,
to mean anything, had to mean that the INS would not op-
pose such a motion.1 9
The court spent considerably more time analyzing the INS's
second argument, that the U.S. Attorney lacked authority to bind
the INS. 20 Applying common law agency principles, the court
stated that an agent may bind the principal only if it has actual
authority-express or implied-to do so:
Therefore, the United States Attorney's promise that the gov-
ernment would not oppose Thomas's § 212(c) application is
binding on the INS if the United States Attorney had either
an express grant of authority to make such a promise, or his
authority for making the promise is incidental to some other
express grant of authority. 121
Examining the duties of the U.S. Attorneys, the court noted that
Congress expressly conferred upon them the power to "prosecute
for all offenses against the United States."02  Congress, however,
specifically delegated to the Attorney General the power to admin-
ister and enforce the INA.123 In turn, the Attorney General has
delegated much of this power to officials of the INS, leading the
court to conclude that "[s]o far as we have found in the Code of
Federal Regulations, no delegation of that authority has been
made to United States Attorneys.'
24
After finding no express delegation, the court next considered
whether the U.S. Attorney's Congressionally-sanctioned power to
prosecute gives her implied authority to prevent the government,
including the INS, from opposing motions for relief from deporta-
tion.125 The court ruled that the U.S. Attorney has such implied
authority. Again citing common law agency principles, the court
held that the power to enter a cooperation agreement and conse-
quently bind the government is an incident of the same
prosecutorial power that gives U.S. Attorneys the implied authority
119. Id. at 1337-38. (citations omitted).
120. See id. at 1338-42.
121. Id. at 1338.
122. Id. at 1339 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 547(1) (1988)).
123. See id. at 1338 (citing8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1994)).
124. Id.
125. See id. at 1339.
126. See id. at 1339-40.
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to negotiate plea bargains. 127 The court specified three reasons for
its holding:
First, deportation commonly arises from the context of crimi-
nal prosecution. It is likely to be a central issue in many
criminal cases involving [noncitizens]. Second, the terms of a
plea or cooperation agreement will commonly affect deporta-
tion. The attorneys will negotiate the offenses of conviction
and sentences partly by considering the effects of these de-
terminations on deportation. Third, there is no reason why,
in the absence of regulations or orders to the contrary, we
should doubt that Congress implied this grant of authority.
2
1
This holding does not mean that the INS is without a remedy.
The court noted that the Attorney General, if she wished, could
limit the authority of the U.S. Attorneys through an appropriate
section in the Code of Federal Regulations, but she has chosen not
129to do so.
This case is a marvelous example of the personhood theory of
noncitizens' rights. Specifically, this case demonstrates three char-
acteristics of the personhood paradigm: (1) the focus is on
constraining government power rather than determining the ex-
tent to which the noncitizen may enjoy the rights of a citizen; (2)
the government is seen as a unified entity rather than separate
branches in instances where it seeks to limit a noncitizen's rights;
and (3) the paradigm recognizes the reality that noncitizens
should be accorded more protection in some instances, especially
since the threat of deportation is a constant in noncitizens' lives.
Let us examine these lessons in turn.
First, the court did not begin by looking at Thomas's nonciti-
zenship in order to determine what process was due. Instead, it
focused on Thomas's claim that the government failed to satisfy its
end of the bargain, which caused a direct harm to Thomas.
30
While it sympathized with the INS's plight owing to the agency's
non-participation in the cooperation agreement talks, the court
stressed that, ultimately, it was Thomas who was "entitled to per-
formance by the government" 13-whether that obligation was
fulfilled by the U.S. Attorney or the INS. Thomas's personhood,
and therefore, his claim against the government, was not dimin-
127. See id.
128. Id. at 1340.
129. See id. at 1341.
130. See id. at 1337.
131. Id.
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ished by his noncitizenship. In the court's eyes, he was entitled to
the same due process as citizens subject to prosecution by the gov-
ernment and its entities.
1
3
2
The personhood paradigm is especially applicable here because
membership issues are of secondary concern in the promise en-
forcement scenario. The primary object of the cooperation
agreement between the government and the noncitizen is to facili-
tate the prosecution of a criminal case, not to affect immigration
law. 13 Put another way, in cooperation agreements, the govern-
ment's main concern is the defendant's cooperation, not the
defendant's citizenship. The Thomas court properly kept its focus
on the government's obligation to keep its promises rather than be
distracted by the defendant's irrelevant citizenship status.
Second, this case is instructive because the court correctly un-
derstood that, in the noncitizen's eyes, the government is
monolithic. When the government purports to negotiate with any
person, noncitizens included, it should not be allowed to feign ig-
norance when one of its branches fails to communicate with
another branch. Thus, drawing an artificial boundary between the
government's immigration arm and its criminal prosecutorial arm
means little to the noncitizen who negotiates in good faith. View-
ing the government as monolithic makes sense, especially when
the government's negotiating arm seeks to acquire from the non-
citizen cooperation that benefits the general public. If the
government wants to reap the benefits of its negotiated deal, it
must also be willing to accept the accompanying burdens.
At one level, "distaste" for the monolithic government also mir-
rors the general sentiment held by some scholars that there should
be little difference between state and federal discrimination
against noncitizens. Commentators have long recognized that ple-
nary power over immigration effectively immunizes the federal
government from equal protection scrutiny when it treats nonciti-
zens worse than citizens, while state governments engaging in the
same discriminatory conduct are generally subject to heightened
scrutiny. This federal/state dichotomy in alienage jurispru-dence has led some to urge that the plenary power doctrine be
132. See id. (accepting Thomas's due process claim); see also Santobello v. New York,
404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (discussing the importance for due process considerations that the
government abide by its promises in the plea agreement context).
133. See Thomas, 35 F.3d at 1337 (analogizing cooperation agreements to plea bar-
gains).
134. See Legomsky, Immigration Law, supra note 40, at 256, 305 n.254; Gerald M. Ros-
berg, The Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment by the National Government, 1977 Sup.
CT. REv. 275, 275-77.
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rejected,' while others have suggested that, at the very least, some
congruence be sought between the levels of scrutiny currently used
to examine federal versus state action. 136 From the noncitizen's
perspective, the view of the government is the same in the Thomas
case as in the plenary power debate: all the noncitizen knows is
that she is being confronted by an American government seeking
somehow to restrict her liberty.
Finally, the court correctly observed that, as a practical matter,
cooperation agreements in criminal law proceedings affect non-
citizens more than citizens because of the "everpresent threat of
deportation."137 Perhaps second only to the inability to vote,38 the
constant threat of deportation divides the noncitizen from the citi-
zen. Because noncitizens cannot exercise the franchise, they are
unable to vote for procedural safeguards to temper prosecutorial
zeal in deportation hearings. 39 Therefore, courts must pay atten-
135. See supra note 40.
136. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 Am.J.
INT'L L. 862, 870 (1989) (suggesting that rather than invoking Congress's plenary power,
"courts ought to examine the justifications offered on behalf of federal regulations based
on alienage to see if they meet traditional constitutional standards of permissibility" and
recommending courts review strictly regulations burdening fundamental constitutional
rights); Gilbert Paul Carrasco, Congressional Arrogation of Power: Alien Constellation in the Gal-
axy of Equal Protection, 74 B.U. L. REv. 591, 603 n.52 (1994) (arguing that the Court has
failed to articulate a viable reason for why state and federal laws would be subject to differ-
ent levels of scrutiny); Romero, Congruence, supra note t, at 428-29 (arguing that Justice
O'Connor's "congruence principle" in the Adarand case may serve as the starting point for
requiring generally stricter scrutiny of some federal alienage classifications); Rosberg, supra
note 134, 316-36 (arguing that constitutional limits on classification by alienage should
apply to federal as well as state government). But see Michael J. Perry, Modem Equal Protec-
tion: A Conceptualization and Appraisa 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1023, 1060-65 (1979) (arguing
that conceptualizing the distinction between levels of scrutiny using the Supremacy Clause,
not equal protection, explains the Court's general deference to federal actions).
137. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY
58 (1983). Ironically, even though deportation is viewed as the enforcement activity most
closely associated with the INS, many noncitizens that the INS expels are undocumented
immigrants caught and repelled at the border. See Patrick J. McDonnell, Formal Departure Is
Much Less Common than Expulsion, LA TIMEs,June 23, 1997, at A14.
138. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102 (1976) (noting that noncitizens
are denied the right to vote); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 161 (1980)
(same); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (protecting the right to vote of citizens only).
Professor Gerald Rosberg has argued that noncitizens with permanent resident status
should be allowed to vote. See Gerald M. Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the
Right to Vote?, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1092, 1110-15 (1977); see alsoJamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens,
Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U.
PA. L. REv. 1391, 1441-60 (1993) (arguing that no logical distinction exists between citizens
and resident aliens for purposes of the voting franchise).
139. While Thomas arguably could have naturalized so he could enjoy the full panoply
of citizens' rights, naturalization is not an option for the vast majority of permanent resi-
dents who are either waiting to apply or are in the process of applying for U.S. citizenship.
See INA § 316(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1427 (West 1998) (noting that legal permanent residents
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tion to the double threat facing a noncitizen charged with a crime:
criminal prosecution and deportation. The Thomas court did just
that. It acknowledged that, when a noncitizen is a criminal defen-
dant, deportation must be considered because any plea or
cooperation agreement could very well involve deportation con-
siderations.'40
In sum, the Thomas decision captures the essence of the person-
hood paradigm: the belief that due process rights require the
government to act fairly in its dealings with both citizens and non-
citizens.
1 41
2. The Membership Paradigm Applied: San Pedro v. United
States-This next subsection examines a case whose facts, though
similar to the facts in Thomas, led the court to deny the noncitizen
protection and implicitly, though likely unintentionally, to assert
the primacy of the membership theory of noncitizens' rights.
Alberto San Pedro is a Cuban citizen, but he has been a lawful
permanent resident of the United States for over forty years. 42 He
was indicted for bribing, and for conspiracy to bribe, a federal
public official. 43 After entering into a plea agreement with the U.S.
Attorney's Office, San Pedro pled guilty to the conspiracy charge
in exchange for transactional immunity.'4 The government prom-
ised not to prosecute San Pedro for any other offenses based upon
evidence revealed during the investigation leading to the bribery
charges.
145
It is at this point that San Pedro's and Thomas's stories con-
verge. As in Thomas, the INS issued an order for San Pedro to show
must have lived in the United States for five years before they are eligible to apply for natu-
ralization).
140. See Thomas, 35 F.3d at 1340.
141. In a case involving similar facts, the Eighth Circuit followed the same reasoning as
the Thomas court in holding that an AUSA could bind the INS to a plea agreement. See
Margalli-Olvera v. INS, 43 F.3d 345, 353 (8th Cir. 1994). The Eighth Circuit panel stated the
following:
[A] n Assistant United States Attorney enters into a plea agreement on behalf of the
United States government as a whole. Accordingly, promises made by an Assistant
United States Attorney bind all agents of the United States government. Therefore,
we hold that unless a plea agreement uses specific language that limits the agents
bound by the promise, ambiguities regarding the agencies bound by the agreement
are to be interpreted to bind the agency at issue.
Id.
142. SeeSan Pedro v. United States, 79 F.3d 1065, 1067 (11th Cir. 1996), cert denied, 519
U.S. 980 (1996).
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 1067 & n.1.
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cause why he should not be deported because of his conviction.) 6
San Pedro responded by filing a petition for writ of mandamus in
federal district court, contending, as did Thomas, that the gov-
ernment's promise in the plea agreement prevented the INS from
deporting him. 147 The government filed a motion to dismiss, argu-
ing, as did the government in Thomas, that it never promised San
Pedro non-deportation, and even if it did, that the promise did not
bind the INS because the U.S. Attorney did not have the authority
to make such a promise.
Converting the motion to dismiss into one for summary judg-
ment, 49 the court ruled that although there was a factual issue as to
whether the government made the non-deportation promise, the
crucial legal issue was whether the U.S. Attorney "had the authority
to promise not to deport a criminal defendant as a condition of a
plea bargain."'50 The court held that neither the U.S. Attorney's
manual nor the INA vested the U.S. Attorney with the power to
bind the INS through a non-deportation clause; accordingly, the
court granted summary judgment in the government's favor.'5
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit grappled with the same issues as
the Thomas court, and indeed, cited Thomas as prior authority.5
While it agreed with the Thomas court that Congress did not ex-
pressly grant the U.S. Attorney power to bind the INS or any other
governmental agency,' the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the
Thomas court's interpretation of the controlling law:
We believe Thomas incorrectly harmonized the statutes that
empower the United States attorneys and the attorney gen-
eral, and failed to consider that the express authority to enforce
immigration law is concentrated solely in the attorney general. It is
unclear to this court, as it was to the district court, why Con-
gress would have granted United States attorneys the
authority to enter into agreements with criminal defendants
that bind the INS while simultaneously granting the authority
146. See id. at 1067.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 1068.
151. See id.; see also United States v. Igbonwa, 120 F.3d 437, 444 (3d Cir. 1997) ("We
hold that the United States Attorney's Office lacks the authority to make a promise pertain-
ing to deportation in the prosecution of a criminal matter that will bind INS without its
express authorization.").
152. See San Pedro v. United States, 79 F.3d 1065, 1069 (11th Cir. 1996). The panel also
noted that the Eighth Circuit had followed the Thomas court's reasoning in a 1994 decision.
See id. (citing Margalli-Olvera v. INS, 43 F.3d 345,353 (8th Cir. 1994)).
153. See id.
[VOL. 32:1
Reconstructing the Alien
to enforce the specific provisions of the immigration laws to
the attorney general in the INA. We therefore follow the
principle, upheld by the Supreme Court on numerous occa-
sions, that a specific statute takes precedence over a more
general one.154
Unlike the Ninth Circuit's affirmation of Thomas's personhood,
the Eleventh Circuit implicitly upheld the theory of membership
by emphasizing the separate, unique status of immigration law en-
forcement. By extension, the San Pedro court also highlighted the
practical disadvantage separate immigration enforcement creates
for noncitizens like San Pedro who cannot rely on a monolithic
government to abide by its promises but instead must specifically
adhere to the INS's rules and requirements, regardless of what
other government agencies might guarantee.
The San Pedro decision emphasizes two other important points
that appear in the Supreme Court's alienage jurisprudence about
membership. First, the court was quick to rely on a seemingly neu-
tral rule of interpretation-that specific statutes take precedence
over more general ones-without examining the adverse conse-
quences to San Pedro. Similarly, the Supreme Court in Mathews v.
Diaz invoked another neutral rule-the plenary power doctrine-
to deny Medicare benefits to certain noncitizens. 55 Arguably, the
distribution of public benefits has little to do with the admission or
expulsion of people, 5 6 which is the basic province of immigration
154. Id. (citing Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6,15 (1978); Brown v. General Servs.
Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 834 (1976)) (emphasis added).
155. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-84 (1976).
156. Some may argue, as I am sure the proponents of Proposition 187 did, that a le-
gitimate way to deter immigration is to create disincentives to immigrate. Thus, the
proponents of California's Proposition 187 would contend that one purpose of denying
Mexican undocumented immigrants medical care is to deter them from crossing the bor-
der illegally. Recent research, however, has affirmed prior studies that most Mexican
immigrants come to the United States to work and not to avail themselves of government
benefits. See WAYNE A. CORNELIUS ET AL., CENTER FOR U.S.-MEXICAN STUDIES, MEXICAN
IMMIGRANTS IN THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA: A SUMMARY OF CURRENT KNOWLEDGE 43-56
(1982) (noting that although undocumented Mexican immigrants in the Bay Area are
commonly thought to be heavy social services users, the available evidence does not support
this characterization); WAYNE A. CORNELIUS ET AL., CENTER FOR U.S.-MEXICAN STUDIES,
MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS AND SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA: A SUMMARY OF CURRENT KNOWLEDGE
52-56, 57 (1982) (noting that first generation undocumented Mexican immigrants tend to
come to the United States to accumulate capital to return to Mexico and discussing the
health care costs associated with undocumented immigrants); PatrickJ. McDonnell, Immi-
grants Not Lured by Aid, Study Says, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1997, at A3 (citing a report by the
Public Policy Institute of California which found that half of all documented Mexican im-
migrants return home within two years, and less than one-third stay as long as ten years,
while undocumented immigrants return home even sooner); see also T. Alexander Aleinik-
off, The Tightening Circle of Membership, in IMMIGRANTS OUT!, supra note 6, at 324-26
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law. Invoking the plenary power doctrine became even more frus-
trating when the Supreme Court held that alienage is a suspect
classification like race and that states may not discriminate against
noncitizens in the distribution of state-sponsored public benefits.
The plenary power doctrine, like the specific statute rule used in
San Pedro,158 provides the court with an apparently legitimate and
neutral way to discriminate against noncitizens but simultaneously
ignores the real hardship such a rule inflicts. 5 9
Second, the San Pedro court characterized the government as
being multidimensional rather than monolithic by emphasizing
the differences between the immigration and prosecutorial powers
of the federal government: The immigration power focuses on the
admission and expulsion issue, while the prosecutorial power
examines the criminal liability of those subject to U.S. law.' ° Yet, in
contrast, the Mathews court chose not to separate the immigration
question (should a noncitizen be admitted or expelled) from the
immigrants' rights question (should a noncitizen be entitled to
public benefits) and instead invoked the plenary power doctrine to
assert a united government's power over immigrants as long as
they are in the United States. 6' Mathews illustrates how courts can
manipulate their characterization of the government from a
singular entity to a fragmented structure to avoid government
responsibility for noncitizens' welfare. The end result is the same,
whether intended or not: the failure to focus on the personhood
of the noncitizen tightens the circle of membership, excluding
those who are not full citizens.
3. Membership Trumps Personhood: Ramallo v. Reno-As a final il-
lustration of the workings of the personhood/membership
dichotomy in recent lower court decisions, this section examines
the curious case of Ramallo v. Reno62 in which Congress intervened
(arguing that denials of public benefits to permanent residents send the message that the
circle of citizenship is growing ever smaller).
157. SeeGraham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
158. See San Pedro, 79 F.3d at 1069.
159. Moreover, the San Pedro court could have invoked some of Motomura's phantom
norms of statutory interpretation to achieve justice, but it chose not to do so. See supra text
accompanying notes 96-99.
160. See San Pedro, 79 F.3d at 1069-70 & n.3; see also Thomas v. INS, 35 F.3d 1332, 1346
n.5 (9th Cir. 1994) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (noting that Congress chose to give both the
Attorney General and U.S. Attorneys prosecutorial power, but authority over immigration
matters rests with the Attorney General alone).
161. SeeMathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976).
162. 931 F. Supp. 884 (D.D.C. 1996) (Ramallo 1), order entered by 934 F. Supp. I (D.D.C.
1996) (Ramabo I), vacated byll4F.3d 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Ramallo III).
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to reestablish the primacy of the membership theory after the
lower court had implicitly endorsed the idea of personhood.
Marlena Ramallo is a Bolivian citizen who entered the United
States in 1972.163 She became a permanent resident in 1978.164 In
August 1986, she pled guilty to the charge of conspiracy to import
cocaine. Three months after Ramallo's conviction, the INS
initiated deportation proceedings against her. 66 During the course
of the deportation proceedings, the government entered into an
agreement with Ramallo in which she promised to assist in
prosecuting other drug traffickers. 67 In return, the government,
with approval of the AUSA, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and
the INS District Director, agreed not to deport Ramallo.' 68
Pursuant to her understanding of the agreement, Ramallo
withdrew her objection to deportability in the INS proceedings.' 9
In apparent violation of the agreement, an INS judge subsequently
issued a deportation order. 7° When the government later
attempted to enforce the order, Ramallo filed suit in federal
district court, claiming violation of her due process rights' 7' and
seeking to enforce the cooperation agreement to restore her to
permanent resident status.
72
After several rounds of briefing, the parties filed cross-motions
for summary judgment. 73 Ramallo claimed that the government
had violated her constitutional rights by breaching its agreement
and, therefore, it was promissorily and equitably estopped from
deporting her. 74 In response, the government argued that, among
other things, the government representatives who dealt with
Ramallo did not have the authority to bind the government'75 -the
163. SeeRamallo 111, 114 F.3d at 1211.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See Ramallo I, 931 F. Supp. at 898-99.
168. See Ramallo II, 934 F. Supp. at 2. In Ramalo , the court noted that Ramallo also
contended that the government agreed to restore her status as a lawful permanent resident.
See Ramallo I, 931 F. Supp. at 889.
169. See Ramallo III, 114 F.3d at 1211.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See Ramallo 1, 931 F. Supp. at 888.
174. Seeid.
175. See id. Although it did not dispute that a cooperation agreement was reached, the
government also claimed that it promised Ramallo only a temporary stay of deportation. See
id. Alternatively, the government asserted that Ramallo had modified the original agree-
ment and therefore was barred from receiving equitable relief under the doctrine of
"unclean hands." See id.
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same argument the government raised before the Thomas and San
Pedro courts.
On the issue of agency, the court cited its approval of Thomas1
76
and its rejection of San Pedro.'77 Ultimately, however, the court de-
cided that it did not need to choose definitively between these
conflicting precedents because an INS agent was directly involved
in the negotiations along with the U.S. Attorney.7 8 If anyone has
authority to bind the INS, "an INS attorney, whose job is to repre-
sent the INS ... in matters of deportation proceedings,""' must
have that power. Soon thereafter, 180 the court granted judgment in
Ramallo's favor, ruling that fundamental due process concerns
required the government to restore Ramallo's status as a lawful
permanent resident. 8
At first blush, Ramallo appears to be a much easier case than ei-
ther Thomas or San Pedro. The Ramallo district court did not have to
choose between the conflicting theories of Thomas's personhood
paradigm and monolithic government on the one hand and San
Pedro's membership paradigm and multidimensional government
on the other. The D.C. District Court simply applied general prin-
ciples of agency law to hold that an INS agent who promises a
noncitizen that she will not be deported binds the INS by that
promise 82-a rather uncontroversial statement.
This obvious truth, however, would not hold sway for long. The
government appealed this case to the District of Columbia Circuit,
claiming that the lower court lacked jurisdiction when it found for
the plaintiff. 3 Although the appellate court did not reach the ju-
risdictional issue, it vacated the decision of the lower court.8 4 After
the district court heard the case, Congress enacted the IIRIRA
8 5
which amended the INA to deprive federal courts ofjurisdiction to
176. See id. at 893-94 (citing Thomas v. INS, 35 F.3d 1332, 1339, 1345 (9th Cir. 1994)).
The court also cited Margalli-Olvera with approval. See id. (citing Margalli-Olvera v. INS, 43
F.3d 345 (8th Cir. 1994)). In Margalli-Olvera, the Eighth Circuit held that the U.S. Attorney's
Office had authority to bind the INS to a plea agreement. See Margalli-Olvera, 43 F.3d at 355.
177. See Ramallo I, 931 F. Supp. at 894 (citing San Pedro v. United States, 79 F.3d 1065
(11th Cir. 1996)).
178. See id.
179. Id.
180. The court denied both sides' motions for summary judgment on the narrow fac-
tual issue of whether the government promised Ramallo that she would not be deported. See
id. at 892. At the ensuing hearing, the court resolved this factual issue in Ramallo's favor
and grantedjudgment for the plaintiff. See Ramallo II, 934 F. Supp. at 2.
181. See id.
182. See Ramallo 1, 931 F. Supp. at 894.
183. See Ramallo IIl, 114 F.3d at 1211.
184. See id. at 1213-14.
185. Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
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decide cases like Ramallo. Section 306(a) of the IIRIRA amends
section 242 of the INA's6 by depriving federal courts of jurisdiction
over noncitizens' claims that arise out of proceedings brought
against the noncitizens by the Attorney General. 1 7 Because
Ramallo's case was a claim arising out of the INS's efforts to deport
her, the IIRIRA barred the federal courts from entertaining her
claim. 188
What started out as a decision closely tracking the personhood
paradigm was transformed into a membership case by Congres-
sional fiat! Indeed, Ramallo did not begin as a controversial case.
Just as a citizen should be able to insist that a prosecutor's promise
bind the prosecuting office, so should a noncitizen be able to sur-
mise that an INS agent's word will obligate the INS. Unfortunately,
Congress, with its plenary power over immigration, invoked the
membership paradigm to quash any claims of equal personhood
Ramallo could have made. 8 9
Ramallo is the most recent example of the American govern-
ment using its power over immigration and naturalization to deny
even the most basic due process rights to noncitizens. So long as
the government continues to value the membership paradigm
(and its enforcer-the plenary power doctrine) over equal per-
sonhood for noncitizens, the circle of membership will continue to
186. Section 242 of the INA deals with the apprehension and deportation of nonciti-
zens. See INA § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1994 & Supp. 111996).
187. See8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (Supp. 111996). Section 1252 now reads in pertinent part:
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION.-Except as provided in this section and notwithstand-
ing any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or
claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney
General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders
against alien under [the INA].
Id. § 1252(g) (Supp. 11 1996). Because this Article focuses on fostering constitutional dia-
logue through the use of social psychology techniques, the constitutionality of the IIRIRA's
court-stripping provision is beyond the scope of this discussion. For an analysis of this latter
point, see generally Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial
Review of Immigration Proceedings, 29 CONN. L. REv. 1411 (1997) (discussing possible judicial
reaction to the jurisdiction stripping provision of the IIRIRA).
188. See Ramallo III, 114 F.3d at 1213.
189. In Ramallo Ii, the circuit court noted that Ramallo was not entirely without a rem-
edy; she could file a habeas claim. See id. at 1214. But this statement rings hollow. Aside
from the difficulty of winning habeas claims, the very fact that this case could turn from an
easy, obvious, and just win for the noncitizen into a denial of jurisdiction for what are im-
portant constitutional claims sends a very strong message that the government has
unbridled discretion as to noncitizens. On the difficulty of pursuing habeas relief, see gen-
erally Stephen B. Bright, Is Fairness Irrelevant?: The Evisceration of Federal Habeas Corpus Review
and Limits on the Ability of State Courts to Protect Fundamental Rights, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1,
4 (1997).
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tighten. What does that mean for people like Marlena Ramallo
and Alberto San Pedro? If they fulfill their promises to the U.S.
government and bring their co-conspirators to justice, not only will
they be denied the right to remain in the United States, they also
face almost certain retaliation upon return to their home coun-
tries. 90
III. REASSERTING THE IMPORTANCE OF PERSONHOOD
The previous two parts of this Article demonstrate the promi-
nence of the membership paradigm in both Supreme Court
jurisprudence and in recent promise enforcement cases brought
before the lower federal courts. Professor Scaperlanda's challenge
still must be met as the paramount question remains: What can be
done to redefine and expand the circle of membership? The work
of ProfessorJody Armour and recent social psychology research on
attitudes about immigrants may help effect a paradigm shift: If we
can all acknowledge the stereotypes we have about others-
immigrants included-we may begin to dismantle those stereo-
types, debunk those myths, and, ultimately, welcome and value the
equal personhood of those who are different.
A. Armour on Stereotype Reduction in Judicial Decision-making
Critical race theorist Professor Armour's work on effective legal
decision-making provides us with a framework for understanding
society's views about the "other." Armour has challenged the
approach adopted by most courts, and advocated by many
commentators, that leaves descriptions of race, gender, and sexual
orientation out of the courtroom because doing so appeals to the
prejudices of the jury.9' Indeed, defense lawyer Johnnie Cochran
often was criticized in the press for "playing the race card" during
190. Despite the potentially greater harm to noncitizens from deportation than from
incarceration, the Supreme Court has held that deportation is a "purely civil action," and
therefore, noncitizens at deportation hearings are not given the same constitutional and
procedural safeguards as in criminal trials. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038-
39 (1984); see also U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR: CIVIL
RIGHTS ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION 97-101 (1980) (discussing the characterization of deporta-
tion hearings as civil in nature).
191. See Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the
Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REV. 733, 736-38 (1995).
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the O.J. Simpson trial.192 When Cochran sought to paint Mark
Fuhrman as racist, critics viewed the accusation as irrelevant to
whether Simpson was guilty of double murder and asserted that it
would make the black jurors empathize with Simpson. Rather than
seeing the acquittal as a reflection of reasonable doubt in the
jurors' minds, some commentators thought the Simpson verdict
was the product of black people acting prejudicially in favor of a
fellow black, ignoring what in critics' minds was overwhelming
evidence of Simpson's guilt.'
3
To enhance the legal decision-making process, Armour chal-
lenges conventional wisdom by drawing distinctions between
constructive and destructive uses of stereotypes about social out-
groups. 194 Borrowing from recent social psychology theory, Armour
distinguishes between prejudice and stereotype: "Stereotypes con-
sist of well-learned sets of associations among groups and traits
established in children's memories at an early age, before they
have the cognitive skills to decide rationally upon the personal ac-
ceptability of the stereotypes. '"' 95 For example, a three-year-old
child, upon seeing a black infant, might describe the infant as a
"baby maid," demonstrating a recognition of the social stereotype
192. See Rob Morse, The Gospel According to Cochran, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 28, 1995, at Al
("Cochran didn't just play the race card before the jury of nine African Americans, two
whites and one Latino. He played the whole race deck."). Indeed, one of Cochran's own
"critics was co-counsel Robert Shapiro who has berated Cochran for playing the race card
'from the bottom of the deck."' Lynda Gorov, Cochran Becomes Celebrity, Draws Criticism, Bos-
TON GLOBE, Oct. 5, 1995, at 31 (quoting Robert Shapiro). Even Senator Arlen Specter
considered probing Cochran's "playing the race card" during closing arguments. See White
House '96-Specter: Considers Probe of Cochran's Conduct in O.J. Trial (visited Oct. 28, 1998)
<http.www.cloakroom.com/pubs/hotline/db2/1995/10/h951011.18 .html>.
193. See, e.g., Martin Gottlieb, Racial Split at End as at Start, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1995, at
Al ("'The case turned when the black jurors pivoted from looking at the murder to looking
at the police .... O.J. should have burned and the cops should have lost their jobs ....".);
Elsa McDowell, OJ Trials Say More About Us than Judiciary, POST & COURIER (Charleston,
SC), Feb. 6, 1997, at BI, available in LEXIS, News Library, PSTCUR File ("People who decry
the criminal acquittal as racially motivated may not be altogether wrong."); Roger Rosen-
blatt, The Simpson Verdict, TIME, Oct. 16, 1995, at 40, 43 ("'Think of it,' a young man said
bitterly. 'O.J.'s lawyer tried to separate the races, and it worked.' He shook his head. 'It's a
payback for Rodney King; that's all it is. Everybody was so stunned to see that police beating
on tape.' ");Jim Steinberg, Fresno Reaction Takes on Racial Overtone, FRESNO BEE, Oct. 4, 1995,
at Al ("White workers by a curb along California Avenue dismissed the trial and verdict with
a word denoting bulls' excrement.... 'It was a done deal,' [said one man], who [was]
white.").
194. See Armour, supra note 191, at 768-69.
195. Id. at 741 (citing Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and
Controlled Components, 56J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 6 (1989)). Armour has incor-
porated many of these arguments in his recent book. See Joo DAVID ARMOUR,
NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA
115-53 (1997). On the nature of prejudice generally, Professor Gordon Allport's treatise on
the subject is a classic. See GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954).
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without having the cognitive wherewithal to approve or disapprove
of the ascription. 196 "In contrast, prejudice consists of derogatory
personal beliefs," those "that people endorse and accept as being
true."' 97 Thus, the three-year-old in our hypothetical who grows up
to reject the stereotype of the black maid is not "prejudiced" under
this definition.
198
Aside from highlighting the distinction between "stereotype"
and "prejudice," Armour notes that social psychologists also differ-
entiate between "low prejudiced" individuals (those who have
personally rejected cultural stereotypes as inappropriate) and
"high prejudiced" individuals (those who know and endorse cul-
tural stereotypes). 99 He argues that people commonly err by
labeling "low prejudiced" individuals who exhibit stereotype-
congruent responses as "racist" when, as social psychologists point
out, "nonprejudiced beliefs and stereotype-congruent thoughts
and feelings may coexist within the same individual."2 0 For exam-
ple, some Southerners, despite rejecting prejudice against blacks,
have expressed feeling squeamish when shaking African Ameri-
cans' hands-a product of residual feelings from their childhood,
201
social scientists say.
Armour next points to empirical evidence that suggests that un-
less they monitor their behavior, low prejudiced people may fall
easily into stereotype-congruent responses and habits because
negative cultural stereotypes are environmentally well-established
and reinforced by the mass media.2 0 2 Thus, prejudice-like responses
196. See Armour, supra note 191, at 741 (citing Phyllis A. Katz, The Acquisition of Racial
Attitudes in Children, in TOWARDS THE ELIMINATION OF RACISM 125, 147 (Phyllis A. Katz ed.,
1976)).
197. Id. at 742 (citing Anthony R. Pratkanis, The Cognitive Representation of Attitudes, in
ATTITUDE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION 71, 91 (Anthony R. Pratkanis et al. eds., 1989)). Simi-
larly, Professor Allport opines that an adequate definition of prejudice must contain an
"attitude of favor or disfavor" that "must be related to an overgeneralized (and therefore
erroneous) belief." ALLPORT, supra note 195, at 13.
198. SeeArmour, supra note 191, at 742.
199. See id. (citing Patricia G. Devine et al., Prejudice with and Without Compunction, 60J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 817, 817-19 (1991)).
200. Id. at 743 (citing Devine, supra note 199, at 817)). This distinction between low-
and high-prejudiced individuals might help reduce feelings of defensiveness among those
in the white majority who, sometimes justifiably, feel like scapegoats every time the question
of white racism is raised. On the issue of affirmative action, for example, some white males
see the issue as one of class rather than race. See, e.g., David Thomas, Initiative Will Level
Playing Field, LA. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1996, at B4, available in 1996 WL 5249221 ("I'm sick and
tired of the bashing from all the groups who are still crying about lack of opportunities in
education and business, and who characterize all white males as racist, sexist animals whose
only job on Earth is to deny others their due.").
201. See Armour, supra note 191, at 743 (citing Daniel [G]oleman, "Useful" Modes of
Thinking Contribute to the Power of Prejudice, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1987, at C1).
202. See id. at 755-57.
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that are sometimes labeled "racist" may simply be the product of a
bad habit rather than a personal belief in the inferiority of a given
203
race.
Armour uses this research to argue against the tendency of
many courts to disallow arguments to the jury relating to race,
gender, sexual orientation, or other group characteristics on the
ground that such evidence engenders prejudice.0 4 He contends
that legal decisionmakers should be reminded of their non-
prejudiced personal beliefs so that they may guard against uncon-
scious discrimination. °5 Armour cites the example of a 1920s case
in which Clarence Darrow effectively utilized this strategy in his
defense of a black doctor, the doctor's relatives, and friends ac-
cused of murdering a white man.0 6 Two days after Dr. Ossian
Sweet and his family moved into a white Detroit neighborhood in
1925, an angry white mob gathered outside their home, shouting
racial epithets and throwing rocks.0 7 As the mayhem intensified,
the police officers who were dispatched to keep the peace did
nothing.208 After seeing a big rock crash through an upstairs win-
dow and the crowd make a sudden movement, Dr. Sweet and his
brother fired a warning shot above the mob; one of the crowd's
members was killed, and all eleven household members were
charged with murder. 9
In his summation before an all-white jury, Darrow challenged
them to resist giving in to their racial prejudices:
I haven't any doubt but that every one of you is prejudiced
against colored people. I want you to guard against it. I want
you to do all you can to be fair in this case, and I believe you
Will....
*.. Here were eleven colored men, penned up in the house.
Put yourselves in their place. Make yourselves colored for a
203. See id. at 756-59. Armour explains: "[T]he research demonstrating disassociation
of stereotypes and personal beliefs in low-prejudiced people argues against the conclusion
that 'we are all racists.' Instead, I suggest that it is more accurate and useful to say that 'we
are all creatures of habit.'" Id. at 759.
204. See id. at 759-60.
205. See id.
206. See id. at 762 (citing Arthur Weinberg, You Can't Live There!, in ATTORNEY FOR THE
DAMNED 229, 229 (Arthur Weinberg ed., 1957) (compiling excerpts of Clarance Darrow's
closing arguments and supplying editorial commentary)).
207. See id. (internal citation omitted).
208. See id. (internal citation omitted).
209. See id. (internal citation omitted).
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little while. It won't hurt, you can wash it off. They can't, but
you can; just make yourself black for a little while; long
enough, gentlemen, to judge them, and before any of you
would want to be judged, you would want your juror to put
himself in your place. That is all I ask in this case, gentlemen.
210
The jury acquitted Dr. Sweet, and the prosecution dropped the
charges against the remaining defendants.1
Darrow's triumph provides an inspiring narrative of the power of
social psychology. As Armour's theory suggests, Darrow's reminder
to the jury members-all white males-of their unconscious procliv-
ity for prejudice forced them to suppress this irrational emotion in
favor of ajust verdict.
More importantly, Armour's research serves as a useful starting
point for engaging in a more informed dialogue about citizenship
and membership in the U.S. polity along the lines envisioned by
Scaperlanda: If social psychologists are correct, American citizens
can train themselves to guard against any lingering stereotypes
they may have against immigrant groups-such as those main-
tained against non-English whites, Chinese, and Mexicans2 -and
reject the primacy of membership in cases where personhood
should prevail, as in the promise enforcement cases discussed
above. Thus, when the government makes a promise in a criminal
proceeding and the promisee upholds her side of the bargain, it
should not matter whether the promisee is a citizen or a foreigner.
Because the IIRIRA currently permits differential treatment on the
basis of citizenship, citizens should act to ensure that noncitizens
receive the same bargain from the government by calling for the
repeal of the Act's court-stripping provisions.
The next section examines recent social psychology scholarship
that explores a citizenry's reactions to new immigrant groups with
an eye toward learning how to reassert the importance of person-
hood in our own constitutional dialogue.
B. Maio et al. 's Research on Attitudes Toward New Immigrant Groups
Strong parallels may be drawn between Armour's references to
race prejudice and the anti-immigrant sentiment in the United
210. Id. at 762-63 (internal citation omitted).
211. See id. at 763 (internal citation omitted).
212. See supra Part I.A.
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States today. First, just as deep-seated historical biases and the me-
dia have contributed to the stereotype of the black male as hostile
or prone to violence, the media have also perpetuated the
stereotype of the "illegal alien" as a young, unskilled Mexican
male, although Mexicans comprised only thirty-nine percent of all
undocumented immigrants in 1992.1 a Further, despite the persis-
tence of these racial and immigrant stereotypes, most people are
low-prejudiced individuals. A recent poll of 1,314 whites, blacks,
and Hispanics, all citizens or residents of the United States since
1980, revealed that while the respondents were divided on the is-
sue of whether immigrants benefit or burden the nation overall,
only one in three respondents offered negative views toward indi-
vidual immigrant groups. In an interesting commentary on how
alienage serves as a proxy for race, the respondents viewed Euro-
pean immigrants in the most favorable light, while Cubans,
Mexicans, Middle Easterners, and people from the Carribean were
perceived most unfavorably. 16 Finally, given this intersection of
race and alienage, 17 Armour's research may prove useful in identi-
fying and confronting racial prejudice masquerading as politically
more palatable anti-immigrant sentiment.218 Armour's work may
213. See Armour, supra note 191, at 752-53 (discussing various studies regarding group
trait stereotypes).
214. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of Immigra-
tion Status, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 42 UCLA L. REv. 1509, 1545-46 (1995) [hereinafter
Johnson, Public Benefits]. Professor Johnson states the following:
The stereotypical 'illegal alien,' the term that replaced 'wetback,' is a Mexican who
has snuck [sic] into the United States in the dark of night. The image in the minds of
many is that of a poor, brown, unskilled, young male .... Despite the stereotype, only
about thirty-nine percent (1.3 million) of the total [number of undocumented im-
migrants in 1992] were from Mexico.
See id. (footnotes omitted).
215. See Poll Shows Americans Softening on Immigration, Assoc. Press, June 15, 1997, avail-
able in Westlaw, ASSOCPR Database [hereinafter Poll]; see also New Immigrants Winning Much
Wider Acceptance-More Americans Meeting Learning About Newcomers, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
June 15, 1997, at A12, available in 1997 NIL 2785222 (explaining how people's encounters
with immigrants, as well as their personal circumstances, shape their attitudes toward new-
comers).
216. See Pol4 supra note 215. Japanese were viewed as the next most favorable group,
followed by Chinese and Africans. See id.
217. I explore the race-alienage dynamic in other articles on equal protection and im-
migrants' rights. See Romero, Congruence, supra note t, at 445-49; Romero, Equal Protection,
supra note t, at 601-02.
218. Karen K. Narasaki, Executive Director of the National Asian Pacific American Le-
gal Consortium, noted the following in an immigration law symposium at Georgetown
University: "My feeling has been that talking about immigrants is really sort of the last ac-
ceptable way to talk about race without actually talking about race." Symposium, Reforming
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enrich Scaperlanda's constitutional dialogue about membership by
forcing U.S. citizens to confront their stereotypes regarding immi-
grant groups, knowing that the root of some stereotypes may be in
racial bias.
Armour's work is just the beginning. Two recent social psychol-
ogy articles specifically address the issue of people's attitudes
toward new immigrant groups and may help advance Scaper-
landa's proposed constitutional dialogue. The first is a study
conducted by Gregory R. Maio et al. to examine how indirect in-
formation regarding a new immigrant group affects people's
attitudes toward that group.2' 9 This experiment started with the
premise that many people first receive information about a new
group indirectly-e.g., through the media-rather than through
direct interpersonal contact. 22 In the study, over two hundred
residents of Ontario, Canada were asked their views regarding the
impending arrival of a fictitious group of new immigrants, the
"Camarians," who were fleeing to various countries because of
natural disasters in their nation.2 ' The subjects were told that the
Canadian Statistics on Immigration Agency expected 7,000 Ca-
marians to arrive in Canada within seven months.2 To examine
the extent to which the subjects' views might be influenced by the
perceived impact the impending immigration might have on their
lives, some subjects were told the Camarians would immigrate to
Ontario (high personal relevance), while others were told the im-
migrants would settle in British Columbia (low personal
223
relevance). The subjects were also told that their views were of
interest because the Camarians might cause a shift in provincial
employment and economic conditions. 4 Finally, the subjects re-
ceived tables that contained fictitious information regarding the
emotions Camarians elicit from others, their personality traits, and
their values. 225 The respondents were told that these tables were
the Administrative Naturalization Process: Reducing Delays While Increasing Fairness-March 6,
1996 Transcript, 10 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 5, 27 (1996).
219. See Gregory R. Maio et al., The Formation of Attitudes Toward New Immigrant Groups,
24J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 1762 (1994).
220. See id. at 1762-63.
221. Seeid. at 1767.
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. See id. The six emotions listed were "comfortable," "curious," "happy," "proud,"
"relaxed," and "respect." Id. at 1768. "Friendly," "hardworking," "honest," "intelligent,"
"loyal," and "polite" were the six personality traits used. Id. The six values included
"economic development," "education," "equality," "family," "freedom," and "law and order."
Id. The fictitious survey reflected the extent to which the Camarians elicited the emotion,
possessed the personality trait, or promoted the value listed. See id.
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taken from a survey of perceptions about Camarians in England
and the Southwestern United States.226 Each subject was randomly
given either uniformly positive information, uniformly negative
information, or a mixture of both positive and negative informa-
tion regarding these three characteristics.2 7 After reviewing the
fictitious survey information, the subjects were asked to indicate
their attitudes toward Camarians using an attitude thermometer
with a scale from zero degrees (extremely unfavorable) to 100 de-
grees (extremely favorable) .s
The study revealed that people formed more favorable attitudes
toward the new immigrant group when they were provided uni-
formly positive information about the emotions elicited by the
group's members, their personality traits, and their values.2 Thus,
those who received uniformly positive information about the Ca-
230
marians were most receptive to their immigration. People who
believed that they would be most affected by the Camarians' immi-
gration acted less favorably-but still positively-to the uniformly
positive information than those for whom the immigration was less
relevant: 31 For example, the Ontarian subjects who were told that
the Camarians would settle in Ontario favored the immigration,
but did so at a lower attitude reading than those who believed the
Camarians would settle in British Columbia, even though both
groups received uniformly positive information regarding the Ca-
marians. 23' Despite its moderating effect on the perception of
uniformly positive information, personal relevance had no no-
ticeable effect on subjects' views toward the Camarians based on
the immigrants' fictitious values. 3 Maio et al. hypothesize that
the subjects may have perceived the emotions elicited by Camari-
ans and their personality traits as having a more immediate,
226. See id. at 1767-68.
227. See id. at 1768.
228. See id.
229. See id. at 1772.
230. See id. at 1770 fig. 1. Although those participants who received uniformly positive
information were more receptive in absolute numbers, while the effect was statistically sig-
nificant for those subjects in the "low relevance" category, see id. at 1769, for those in the
"high relevance" category, the difference between those who received uniformly positive
information and those who received mixed information was not statistically significant. See
id. at 1771.
231. See id. at 1772. Interestingly enough, where mixed positive and negative informa-
tion was received, the respondents actually responded more favorably to immigration when
they perceived it to be more relevant to their lives, although not as favorable as their re-
sponse to uniformly positive information. See id. at 1772-73.
232. See id. at 1772.
233. See id. at 1773.
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personal effect on the respondents' lives than the more abstract
notion of values. 34
In constructing our dialogue about membership, we should
consider Maio et al.'s findings. Their study teaches us that while
imparting positive consensus information is important in fostering
favorable attitudes toward new immigrants, it is even more
important to recognize that personal relevance bias plays a
significant role. To convince citizens of the value of the
personhood of immigrants, one must find a way to convey positive
images of "the immigrant as person" that will resonate with the
citizens so that the natives becomes personally vested in the
immigrant's plight. This "connection" between in-group and out-
group members is what Darrow successfully accomplished in
obtaining Dr. Sweet's acquittal, and this is the challenge faced by
those seeking to restore personhood's importance in the debate
over immigrants' rights.
How do we achieve this "connection" in our constitutional dia-
logue? The second study by Maio et al. provides support for
Armour's position that informing decision-makers of their inher-
ent biases may enhance their evaluative processes. Psychological
research has shown that while most people do not subscribe to ra-
cial discrimination, they unconsciously retain certain negative
236
stereotypes about many out-groups. Other research has shown
that people may hold both positive and negative views of an out-
group. For example, while some white Americans hold negative
views toward blacks, they may simultaneously sympathize with their
plight.2 7 As a follow-up to the above-mentioned study, Maio et al.
decided to test the effect this kind of ambivalence might have on
the way people process persuasive messages about certain minority
groups.2 Like many of the studies Armour cites, Maio et al.'s ex-
periment addressed the issue of how people with conflicting
attitudes process information.239
This study was conducted in two parts: First, over 113 psychology
undergraduates were evaluated on the ambivalence of their atti-
tudes toward "Oriental" people, defined by the researchers as
234. See id.
235. See Gregory R. Maio et al., Ambivalence and Persuasion: The Processing of Messages
About Immigrant Groups, 32J. EXPERIMENTAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 513, 532-33 (1996).
236. See supra Part III.A.
237. See Maio et al., supra note 235, at 514 (citing Irwin Katz & R. Glen Hass, Racial Am-
bivalence and American Value Conflict: Correlational and Priming Studies of Dual Cognitive
Structures, 55J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 893 (1988)).
238. See id. at 514. Although describing the research in terms of "minority" groups, the
study provided subjects with information about immigrant minority groups. See id. at 516.
239. See id. at 514.
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persons from China, Japan, and Hong Kong.24° Next, each subject
was given either a "strong" or "weak" persuasive message in favor
of immigration from Hong Kong: The strong message described a
strong tendency for Hong Kong residents to elicit positive emo-
tions from people, possess positive personality traits, and favor
positive values; the weak message described a weak, but still posi-
tive, tendency. 24' The researchers then examined the effect of these
messages on the subjects' agreement with immigration from Hong
Kong, favorability toward Hong Kong residents, and the immigra-
tion-related thoughts the subjects listed in response to the
242
messages.
The study demonstrated that those people who possessed
"ambivalent attitudes toward [the immigrants were] more likely to
systematically process persuasive messages about the group than
[those] people who [held] unambivalent attitudes toward the
group."243 Thus, the ambivalent participants given the strong positive
message about immigration from Hong Kong favored this immigra-
tion more than those who received the weak positive message, while
unambivalent respondents were not affected differentially by the
strong and weak messages. 44 Maio et al. posited that because they
had conflicting views of the out-group, ambivalent persons would
not only be more motivated to pay attention to new information
about that group but also be better able to process such new in-
245formation.
It is at this point that Armour's and Maio et al.'s theories com-
plement each other. If both theories are correct in assuming that
most people are, in varying degrees, ambivalent about out-group
members, and that ambivalent people are more effective than un-
ambivalent people in processing information about the out-group,
then it behooves us all to develop strategies to communicate posi-
tive messages about personhood to citizens acting to define
membership in this polity.
For example, throughout history, many U.S. businesses have
been ambivalent about employing undocumented Mexican immi-
grants.246 On the one hand, the industries enjoy the fruits of cheap
240. See id. at 516.
241. See id. at517.
242. See id.
243. Id. at 528.
244. See id.
245. See id. at 530.
246. See Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the Undocumented
Worker Under United States Law, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 955, 956; L6pez, supra note 48, at 657. The
ambivalence exists to this day in California, which has recently been in need of farm work-
ers. Indeed, John Ledbetter, an officer of Vino Farms, Inc., in Lodi, California, stated that
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labor; on the other, the businesses do not want to encourage un-
documented immigration.24 v So when an undocumented worker is
sexually harassed by her employer and reports the abuse to the
authorities, should she be subject to deportation because of her
status? Should the immigrant's lack of membership in the polity
preempt her personal claim to protection from abuse? What is
more important: discouraging "illegal" immigration or preventing
employer abuse? The average citizen holds little sympathy for the
stereotype of the "illegal alien" as the unskilled, dark-skinned
Mexican laborer sneaking into the United States2  but the citizen
decision-maker must fight against that stereotype by considering
three additional points. First, regardless of how one feels about
undocumented immigration, the immigrant in this case is a person
who suffered sexual harassment. Second, by deporting the immi-
grant, the United States sends the message that it discourages the
reporting of similar incidents of sexual abuse. Third, and perhaps
most importantly, the definition of whether one is a "legal" or
"illegal alien" may depend upon the country from which one hails.
For instance, a Mexican citizen who enters the United States with-
out a valid visa is automatically an "illegal alien," while many
Western European citizens may remain in the United States for up
to ninety days without one.249
With this new information, the ambivalent citizen, aware that
she is influenced by the media-driven image of the "illegal alien"
stereotype, might be able to process this positive data effectively to
reach a decision valuing personhood over membership. One good
example of a citizen who decided to reassert the importance of
personhood is Rudolph Giuliani, the Republican mayor of New
York City. Giuliani, who is sometimes criticized for being unsympa-
the federal government might want to consider "[s] ome type of a program that allows peo-
ple to legally come to this country to work on a temporary basis...." Lynn Graebner,
Farmers Face Shortage of Laborers, Bus. J.-SACRAMENTO, Oct. 31, 1997, at 3, available in 1997
WL 15017468.
247. Michael Posner, Executive Director of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights,
recently stated the following: "We're schizophrenic about immigration .... On the one
hand, we want control of our borders, and I think that's right. On the other hand, we want
cheap immigrant labor. That's what keeps whole industries alive. That is the bargain, and
we should be honest about it." Haberman, supra note 54, at B1.
248. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
249. See Berta Esperanza Hernsindez-Truyol, Reconciling Rights in Collision: An Interna-
tional Rights Strategy, in IMMIGRANTS OUT!, supra note 6, at 254, 255. Professor Kevin
Johnson notes that one-half of all undocumented immigrants were visa overstays; thus, the
failure to address this issue, while simultaneously beefing up the U.S.-Mexico border, signi-
fies a desire to reduce only undocumented Mexican immigration, not all undocumented
immigration. SeeJohnson, Public Benefits, supra note 214, at 1547.
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thetic to minority concerns, 250 believes that it is more important to
encourage the reporting of abuse suffered by immigrants than to
worry about the "illegal" presence of undocumented persons."'
Indeed, he recently vowed to appeal a lower federal court decision
invalidating an executive order that prohibited city employees
from turning in undocumented immigrants who sought basic serv-
252ices such as police protection. By adopting the strategies outlined
by Armour and Maio et al., "We the People" might be in a better
position to reach decisions on immigrants' rights matters unfet-
tered by the stereotypes that might cause us to discount the value
of equal personhood. In turn, this should lead to legislative action
consistent with these ideals.
The final section applies the social psychology research outlined
here to articulate a model for re-injecting personhood into the
discussion of the promise enforcement cases discussed above.
C. Application of Social Psychology Research to the
"Promise Enforcement" Cases
Like the issue of undocumented immigrant employment, the
promise enforcement cases raise the issue of balancing member-
ship and personhood concerns. In the promise enforcement cases,
the question is whether a noncitizen should be precluded from
receiving the benefit of her bargain with the government simply
because of her foreign status. Put another way, does her foreign,
nonmembership status preempt her personal right to enforce her
claim that the government promised not to deport her in ex-
change for her cooperation?
Assuming that the federal courts have abdicated the member-
ship decision to the citizenry, as Scaperlanda suggests, how does
the social psychology research cited here help "We the People"
value personhood in the midst of a discussion about membership?
First, citizens must, as Armour's research indicates, acknowledge
their deep-rooted, media-influenced biases, which include anti-
immigrant sentiment, as well as the United States' long and sordid
250. In one infamous incident, Giuliani went head-to-head with the flamboyant Rever-
end Al Sharpton and his followers over the use of the Brooklyn Bridge for a march to
celebrate Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s birthday. See Kirk Johnson, Words of Peace
and Protest on King Holiday, N.Y. TIMEs,Jan. 16, 1996, at BI. Giuliani prohibited the march-
ers from using the entire bridge because they would impede the flow of traffic. See id.
Sharpton compared Giuliani to a southern segregationist. See id.
251. See id.
252. See Haberman, supra note 54, at BI.
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history of alienating newcomers.253 Related to this first point, citi-
zens must reflect upon whether any anti-immigrant stereotypes
they harbor have roots in racial bias. Second, citizens must, as Dar-
row suggested in his defense of Dr. Sweet, put themselves in the
shoes of the noncitizen. After all, many of their ancestors were
once noncitizens. Do not citizens expect that a government will
abide by its promises to them? Third, citizens must ask themselves
whether the primary purpose of due process as it relates to prom-
ise enforcement cases is to restrain government action against
citizen and noncitizen alike or to ensure the primacy of a citizen's
rights over those of a noncitizen. Because Maio et al.'s work reveals
that ambivalent people are better at processing new information
than unambivalent people, and current data suggest that most
Americans are ambivalent about immigration and immigrants,
adopting the social psychology techniques outlined here may lead
to a more self-aware citizenry better able to engage in a dialogue
about membership without forgetting the importance of person-
hood. 54 Unlike Armour's application of such research to judicial
decision-makers, this Article advocates that U.S. citizens use these
techniques to help construct fair alienage policies that value equal
personhood. Hopefully, a reflective and thoughtful citizenry will
call for the repeal of the court-stripping provisions of the IIRIRA
and will ensure that, at a minimum, the U.S. government abides by
its promises to all, citizen and noncitizen alike.
253. See supra Part lA.
254. I am aware that some may not share my view that citizens should show empathy
toward criminal noncitizens. SeeAnthony Lewis, Accent the Positive, N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 10, 1997,
at A29. The article discusses Senator Spencer Abraham's view that to make the case for legal
immigration, one must also "make clear that you're going to address the negatives, espe-
cially criminal [noncitizens]. There is a public feeling against those who come here and
commit crimes." Id. As mentioned earlier, however, the wrongdoing in the promise en-
forcement context is committed by the government, not the noncitizen. It is the
government that reneges on its promises in these cases, benefits from the noncitizen's per-
formance, and then acts to deport the noncitizen simply because it can do so under the law.
I contend that the government should be constrained in promise enforcement cases in a
manner similar to the limitations on government activity in other criminal contexts. For
example, government agents may not beat confessions out of defendants under the Four-
teenth Amendment, see Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936), and they may not
illegally search a person's property under the Fourth Amendment. See Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-93, 398 (1914). Society as a whole benefits from such restraints on
government activity. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961) ("Nothing can destroy
a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of
the charter of its own existence.").
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CONCLUSION
The tension between membership and personhood in the realm
of immigrants' rights law has been, and will continue to be, of
paramount concern to U.S. citizens. Because this issue is so impor-
tant, we, the citizens of this country, must tread cautiously as we try
to define what it means to be an American. Although membership
will probably always be the starting point for determining ques-
tions of citizenship, it need not be the endpoint. We live in a
society steeped in a culture of xenophobia and invidious anti-
immigrant stereotypes, some of which are rooted in racial bias. It
behooves us all to acknowledge and then transcend these preju-
dices if we are to ensure that the value of equal personhood retains
true constitutional significance in our society. Otherwise, someone
we know and hold dear might be the next Ms. Santiago-an
"alien" whose personhood is sacrificed at the altar of non-
membership.
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